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Preface 
I have adhered to standard citation practices for the Peirce literature wherever 
such standards exist.  On that basis, references to Peirces work appear in the following 
notation throughout: 
The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. 1-8:  CP (volume #):(page #) 
 
Writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. 1-6:  W (volume #):(page #) 
 
Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard 
Lectures on Pragmatism: PPM (lecture#):(page #) 
 
Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conference Lectures: RLT 
(lecture#):(page#) 
 
References to articles cited appear in the following notion: 
 
Belief, Confidence and the Method of Science: BCM,(page#) 
 
C.S Peirce on Vital Matters: PVM,(page#) 
 
Peirces Account of Inquiry: PIA,(page#) 
 
The Key to Peirces View of the Role of Belief in Scientific Inquiry: PVRB,(page#) 
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1. Introduction 
Belief is a central concept in the field of epistemology.  It is also a fundamental 
aspect of human experience: we hold beliefs, argue over them, and try to justify them.  
We live by them, but we may kill for them or die for them.  We judge ourselves and 
others according to their quality.  We let them guide our lives even while striving to make 
them reflect the world accurately.  Belief is, in a word, essential. 
The purpose of this project is to present, explore and evaluate an innovative 
account of belief, that proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of classical 
American pragmatism.  Some philosophers have claimed that Peirce makes remarks 
about belief that are false or misguided, which undermine his otherwise solid 
epistemology, and, in turn, the systematic character of his philosophy.  There are two 
major issues with Peirces later theory of the role of belief in science. Firstly, it calls into 
doubt the relation between philosophy and everyday practice1; and secondly, it appears at 
times to render Peirces larger account of belief internally inconsistent. 
I am prepared to argue that Peirces remarks about belief, and particularly the role 
of belief in science, are consistent and pose no threat to the coherency of his 
epistemology or philosophical system as a whole.   I will also argue that properly 
understood, the maverick comments that cause such distress to some interpreters of his 
work provide an important insight into the nature of the guiding principles of Peirces 
philosophy as a whole.  In order to furnish this argument with the correct weaponry, it 
will be necessary for me to do the following: as a starting point, I will explore the place 
of belief in Peirces philosophy and review the standard interpretation of Peirces theory 
                                                
1 The latter category is the one wherein Peirce places all action and all moral matters. 
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of belief, which is based on his early epistemology.2  Next, it will be necessary to see 
where and how Peirce presents the comments on belief that draw the aforementioned 
criticism and concern from his interpreters.  Assessing these comments in their original 
context will be helpful to the next stage of my analysis, where I will consider two 
methods of resolving what is often taken to be a disturbing undercurrent in Peirces later 
thought with his less complex early account.  Both of the methods currently being 
advanced by contemporary pragmatists are in favour of reassessing Peirce on belief in a 
helpful way, although each proposes to do so by different means: what I call the 
parsimonious Peircean position is in favour of excising portions of Peirces commentary 
on belief in order to render what remains less controversial and more utile, while what I 
have labelled the conservative Peircean position is in favour of letting Peirces comments 
on belief stand and simply reframing them within the context of his system as a whole.  
Both methods rely on considerable textual and interpretive legwork, as there is no 
authoritative map to the philosophical wilds of the Peircean architectonic.  As such, this 
is first and foremost a research paper. 
In the course of my researches, a new position will emerge, one that attempts to 
read Peirce critically and give him his philosophical due.  Both of the accounts 
considered in my analysis are generous to Peirce in their particular ways, but both are 
also hampered by problems that can be resolved by a return to the original texts: by 
letting Peirce speak for himself and recognizing the role that his first principles play in 
the development of his account of belief, it becomes apparent that Peirce can escape the 
standard charges of contradiction with his original theory very much intact.  I will argue 
                                                
2 For the purposes of this investigation, I delineate Peirces early epistemology as the period from roughly 
1865 to 1878, and his later epistemology as the period from 1898 to 1914.  I will explain the rationale for 
this separation momentarily. 
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that disagreeing with Peirce about belief amounts to disagreeing with the first principles 
of his philosophy; to do so, while possibly perfectly intelligible, requires an argument at a 
methodological and meta-philosophical level that is outside of the scope of the accounts 
considered in this paper.  Finally, I will conclude that whether one chooses to pursue that 
level of criticism or not, what must be admitted is that Peirces account of belief is 
internally consistent without the imposition of revisions based on competing first 
principles.
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2. Peirces Theory of Belief 
One of the attractive features of Peirces work is its tremendous breadth  his 
intent was to give the world a new system of philosophy3, and much that is original and 
interesting arises from his dedication to this goal.  Many think that Peirce was at least 
somewhat successful in achieving his lofty aims.  Paul Weiss claims that [Peirce] is the 
most original and versatile of Americas philosophers.4 Robert Brandom refers to the 
early Cambridge pragmatists, of whom Peirce was certainly the ringleader5, as founders 
of a third enlightenment.6  Whatever one might think of the validity of the claim that the 
inception of pragmatism constitutes a watershed in the history of philosophy, one thing is 
clear: Peirces dedication to multiple research foci means both that his work is 
remarkably wide-ranging and that seemingly disparate areas of his work are deeply 
interconnected. 7  This demonstrates the need for clarity in the project undertaken here. 
One cannot comprehend Peirce on truth, reality, science, or semiotics without reference 
to his view of belief.  In the words of Canadian Peirce scholar Cheryl Misak, Peirces 
                                                
3 The closest Peirce came to achieving this goal is arguably the unfinished A Guess at the Riddle, begun 
in 1887, which explores the application and ramifications of his innovative triadic ontology.  Peirce made 
his dedication to the categories apparent very early in his philosophical development; they appear in 
embryonic form in the 1867 paper On A New List of Categories and continue to occupy Peirce for the 
rest of his intellectual life.  In A Guess at the Riddle, he makes the sweeping statement that To erect a 
philosophical edifice that shall outlast the vicissitudes of time, my care must be, not so much to set each 
brick with nicest accuracy, as to lay the foundations deep and massive. W6:167. 
4 Weiss, Biography of C.S. Peirce in Richard J. Bernstein (ed.), Perspectives on Peirce, p.12. 
5 The era surrounding the inception of The Metaphysical Club, where pragmatism is purported to have been 
first advanced by Peirce, is a rich and interesting part of Americas intellectual tapestry.  There is no 
dispute to speak of regarding Peirces role as founder of the distinctly American doctrine, which is well 
reviewed in the introduction to the third volume of the Writings of Charles S. Peirce and treated in more 
depth in Louis Menards The Metaphysical Club. 
6 Brandom, The Pragmatist Enlightenment and Its Problematic Semantics, European Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol.12, No.1, pp 1-16.. 
7 It is widely accepted amongst Peirce scholars that regardless of which area of his work one is interested 
in, a firm grasp of its development is deeply illuminating.  Consider this advice from the Charles S. Peirce 
Society to entrants in its annual essay contest: Entrants should note that scholarly work on Peirce 
frequently benefits from the explicit consideration of the historical development of his views. Even a 
submission that focuses on a single stage in that development can benefit from noting the stage on which it 
focuses in reference to other phases of Peirce's treatment of the topic under consideration. 
(http://www.peircesociety.org/essayContest.html) 
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thought was constantly evolving: not much in his system lies static, isolated, or 
unconnected.8  As such, gaining an accurate understanding of Peirce on belief can gain 
us a foothold in accessing his grand architectonic system.  It should be noted here that our 
inquiry will proceed chronologically, from Peirces early epistemology to his later theory 
of belief, and from there to the contemporary era and a live debate concerning the 
interpretation of his views.  The early period, which I frame as being roughly 1865 to 
1878, covers Peirces earliest extant epistemological writings and his most famous 
published series, Illustrations of the Logic of Science.  After that series was published, 
Peirce was much occupied by his work with the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, as well 
as the development of his famous  or infamous  categories, which is primarily 
metaphysical work, and the advancement of his innovative logic. Though there is little 
doubt that there are significant connections between these various areas of Peirces work, 
new theses that are clearly epistemological in nature are scarce until the beginning of 
what I frame as Peirces later epistemology, which is the 1898 Cambridge Conference 
lectures.  From this point until Peirces death in 1914, he was much concerned with 
disambiguating his own theory and contrasting it with what was then widely being 
popularized under the title of pragmatism.  In these later writings, notably also 
including the Harvard lectures of 1903, Peirce presented new ideas about central 
epistemological notions, including belief, and clarified their relation to his earlier views, 
which makes this later work invaluable.  My hope is that the chronological progression 
through the evolution of Peirces work on belief will help to satisfactorily illuminate its 
inner workings, and ultimately resolve the contemporary debate as to which interpretation 
of that material is most true to Peirces system of philosophy.  Thus, with a weather eye 
                                                
8 Misak, Truth and the End of Inquiry, p.vii. 
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to its historical development and its theoretical connections, let us now embark on an 
exegesis of Peirces account of the essential epistemic notion of belief. 
2.1 Emphasis on Belief in Practice 
 A distinct emphasis on the practical properties of belief is apparent quite early in 
the development of Peirces epistemology  at least as early as his draft titled Questions 
on Reality9, which would become the 1868 essay Questions Concerning Certain 
Faculties Claimed for Man.  Published as the first in a series on cognition for the nascent 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy10, the business of this paper is comparing believing 
and conceiving as modes of knowing.11  Here, Peirce concerns himself mainly with 
describing what belief seems like to us as believing subjects, rather than what kind of 
thing belief is in itself.  The question in the discussion at hand is whether humans have an 
intuitive power whereby we distinguish the different types of cognitions that we 
experience.  Peirce initially suggests that the pronounced differences between conceiving 
and believing support the existence of such a faculty.  In discerning the two, we identify 
belief by the following key features: the knowledge of belief is essential to its existence, 
and belief is accompanied by a peculiar feeling of conviction that is absent in the case 
of mere conception.12  Despite the fact that both of these characteristics are intuitively 
clear, particularly the latter13, Peirce ultimately determines that differences in the 
perceived quality of the state of belief as compared to the state of conception do not 
                                                
9 MS 148: Winter-Spring 1868. 
10 It is perhaps worth noting that this paper originates in metaphysical worries regarding the kinds of 
faculties that exist, though it quite naturally goes on to explore the existence of such faculties via our 
evidence for and against them, which takes us to the matter of how we might know of their existence.  
Indeed, C.F. Delaney describes Peirces project in the series on cognition as getting at the manner of 
reality itself, by way of ascertaining how we think.  W 2:xxxix. 
11  W 2:205. 
12 W 2:205. 
13 The most brief experiment supports Peirces claim here.  Reflection on a believed proposition as 
compared to a doubted proposition quickly yields the conviction that ones attitude to each differs. 
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support the notion that belief requires any special power of consciousness.  Belief, despite 
its unique characteristics in our subjective experience, does not owe its occurrence to a 
unique faculty.  
 What Peirce thinks we need to know about the nature of belief itself goes little 
further than this, as even his attempts to define belief directly are comprised mainly of 
propositions regarding its functionality.  One such definition appears in Questions 
Concerning Reality, where he goes so far as to say that it is a mere question of words 
whether we define belief as the judgment which is accompanied by this feeling [of 
certainty], or as that judgment from which a man will act.14  The first Peirce terms 
sensational belief; the latter, active belief  and though they are conceptually 
separable insofar as one does not necessitate the other15, they generally occur in concert.16  
The sensational belief is identified as it appears as an object of consciousness, while the 
active belief makes itself known by the observation of external facts.17  Despite the fact 
that we identify the presence of each type of belief differently, all that either alone or both 
together can comprise is a judgment.  This reinforces Peirces previous assertion that 
despite the difference in the perceived quality of the state of belief as compared to the 
state of conception, belief does not require any special power of consciousness, in either 
the sensational or the active sense  the inception of belief-judgments is no different than 
that of conception-judgments.18  At this point,  Peirce appears fully satisfied that he has 
determined belief to be no different in kind than any other sort of cognition, and also not 
                                                
14 W 2:205. 
15 Peirce states clearly that neithernecessarily presupposes the other.  W2:171. 
16 Since they are not necessarily operationally distinct, this division is of little concern at this point in our 
analysis, though we will return to it later. 
17 W 2:171. 
18 W2:205. 
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a product of any special intuitive faculty.  Belief is no more than a type of judgment of 
which we aware.  That I believe, he states, is quite evident.19  
This rudimentary definition can be contrasted to a later, more fanciful formulation 
that occurs in 1878s How To Make Our Ideas Clear, where Peirce gives the following 
pithy explanation of the definiendum: belief is the demi-cadence which closes a musical 
phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life.20  In explaining just what that means, 
Peirce again takes recourse to describing the properties of belief in a way that emphasizes 
the practical import of those properties.  Belief, we are told, has just three properties: 
we are aware of it; it appeases the irritation of doubt; and it involves establishing rules for 
action.21  All three of these properties concern belief as it seems to us or performs for us: 
we notice when we believe a particular proposition; in believing that proposition we ease 
any doubts that we may have previously held with respect to it; and we know what 
actions we are likely to perform on the habits built upon belief in that proposition. 
Despite the ten-year window between Questions Concerning Certain Faculties 
Claimed for Man and How to Make our Ideas Clear, Peirces view of belief remains 
constant in its essential elements.  Not only do the two separate definitions and 
discussions of the properties of belief presented in these papers confirm that Peirce is 
most concerned with practical aspects of belief  what it is like and how it operates for 
believing subjects  they also demonstrate a remarkable continuity in Peirces evolving 
philosophical views.  Never at any point does Peirce express concern for belief-in-itself, 
                                                
19 H1:116.  Peirces suggestion that the state of belief is easily recognized relies on accepting the notion that 
one can identify such a state on the basis of the actions one is disposed to because of it.  Although Peirces 
account does not rule out the ascription of actual cognitive content to belief, it cashes out the practical 
import of belief in primarily dispositional terms. 
20 W3:263. 
21 W3:263. 
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for the ding an sich of the state of belief.  Once satisfied that his account demonstrates 
why the significance of any given belief is merely its sensible effects, Peirces interest in 
belief shifts to the particulars of its role: how it opposes doubt, ends inquiry, guides 
action, and aims at the truth.   
2.2 Opposition to Doubt 
 The internal hallmark of belief, Peirce states, is a peculiar feeling of 
conviction.22  This is why, as we saw earlier, we can clearly separate the feeling of 
believing from that of doubting without positing some faculty that makes this distinction 
possible.  Peirce seems to think that this sensational difference deserves remark on 
numerous occasions.  Variously, we are told that there is a dissimilarity between the 
sensation of doubting and believing23; that doubt is uneasy and dissatisfied while 
belief is calm and satisfactory24; and that doubt causes irritation while belief relieves 
it.25 
As I suggested earlier, everyday experience supports Peirces somewhat bald 
assertion that we just can tell the two states apart.  Let us consider a sample case: suppose 
that we have two students writing a midterm in ancient philosophy.  One of these students 
has attended tutorials, done her reading, and completed a helpful review session the night 
before the test, while the other skips class occasionally, vaguely recalls that Plato and 
Socrates are Greek fellows, and spent the pre-test evening alternately complaining about 
her lot in life and frantically cramming Aristophanes Clouds, which she takes to be 
veridical rather than satirical.  What each student feels while writing the midterm will be 
                                                
22 W2:205. 
23 W3:22.  As a note regarding the continuity of Peirces thought, it is encouraging for that thesis that very 
nearly the same passage occurs in The Fixation of Belief, W3:247. 
24 W3:22. 
25 W3:263. 
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as one would expect: the prepared student will believe that she knows the correct 
answers, and be relatively serene in the process of putting them to paper.  By contrast, the 
ill-prepared student will doubt that she knows the correct answers, and experience 
considerable anxiety and discomfort during the test as a result.  Each of us has 
experienced such feelings  if not in such a setting  and has little difficulty in 
differentiating them.26  As Peirce says, We almost always know without any experiment 
when we are in doubt and when we are convinced.27 
This sensational difference; however, is not all that separates the mental state of 
belief from that of doubt.  That difference is accompanied by an important practical 
difference: belief guides action, while doubt exerts only a limited force upon it.28  This 
means that in addition to being able to separate belief from doubt on a sort of internal, ad 
hoc basis, we are also able to identify the two states by external hallmarks that appear as 
the practical consequences of the state in question manifest via behaviour.  If we return to 
the case of the ancient philosophy midterm, it should be apparent that in addition to the 
difference in mental tranquility experienced by the students, behavioural differences 
would be apparent to an outside observer.  We would expect to see the well-prepared 
student putting her reading and reflection to good use by writing steadily and confidently, 
while her less studious compatriot alternates between frantically scribbling and staring 
despondently into space. 
                                                
26 Consider: it is normal to say I believed such-and-such, but not I thought that I believed such-and-
such.  We appear to have a very high degree of transparency with respect to the states of doubt and belief, 
at least so long as we are being honest with ourselves and mindful of monitoring changes in our mental 
states. 
27 W3:20. 
28 W3:21. 
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Despite remarking repeatedly on both the sensational and the practical difference 
between doubt and belief, Peirce is careful to remind us that they are not different in kind, 
but merely in degree.  Both are mental states which stimulate us in certain ways, and both 
have what Peirce terms positive effects, albeit different ones.29  While belief conditions 
us to act a certain way, and act that way reliably, doubt can only stimulate us to try to 
destroy it and thereby attain the comfortable state of belief.  As such, we might best 
summarize Peirces view on the relationship as similar to that of two forces working in 
harness: when belief stops pulling, doubt takes over, and vice versa.  Without the 
irritation of doubt, we would never enter into the struggle to attain a state of belief; we 
would never be moved to inquire  and inquiry, in Peirces view, is the only legitimate 
method for the acquisition of true beliefs.  
2.3 Belief & Inquiry 
 Peirces view on the relationship between belief and inquiry is perhaps best 
described in one of his most famous papers, The Fixation of Belief.  Published in 1877 
as the first in a series of six essays entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science30, this 
essay represents the unification of several strands of Peirces thought into the first 
reasonably complete expression of his epistemology.  Here, Peirces project is to develop 
further the relationship between doubt and belief, and to emphasize the importance of 
inquiry, which he sees as the only acceptably scientific method of fixing belief.  It is 
important in tracing the developmental arc of Peirces thought to note; however, that 
Peirces sustained interest in belief and inquiry manifested itself well before this 
celebrated essay reached publication in Popular Science. 
                                                
29 W3:22; W3:247. 
30 This series was published between November 1877 and August 1878 and, though incomplete, is cited by 
Max Fisch as the Discourse on the Method of the 19th century.  W3:xxxvii. 
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2.3.1 Early Formulations of the Methods of Belief Acquisition 
 Peirces four methods of fixing belief first appear in rudimentary form in the 1872 
drafts of the first three chapters of his projected book on logic, variously titled Logic, 
Truth and the Settlement of Opinion, Investigation and the Settlement of Opinion, Of 
the Difference Between Doubt and Belief, Of Inquiry, and Four Methods of Settling 
Opinion.31  Here, in various forms, Peirce introduces and outlines the methods of 
obstinacy, despotism32, popular opinion, and scientific investigation.33 
 With respect to the method of obstinacy, Peirce observes that This simple and 
direct method is really pursued by many men.34  The guiding principles of the method in 
question are to dwell on that which is conducive to ones favoured belief and 
systematically ignore all else, ignoring also the inconveniences associated with such a 
manner of operating in the world.  Regarding the motive for this method, Peirce suggests 
that it provides a cheap pleasure not easily obtained in the search for truth, which is 
fraught with error and disappointment.35  Those who assiduously follow the method of 
obstinacy are likened to ostriches:  When an ostrich buries its head in the sand as danger 
approaches, it very likely takes the happiest course.  It hides the danger and then calmly 
says there is no danger; and if it feels perfectly safe that there is none, why should it raise 
its head to see?36  Despite his obvious scorn for the lack of impetus to truth displayed by 
advocates of the method of obstinacy, Peirce also grants that if such people adopting this 
mode do not pretend to rationality, there is little to say in criticism, as all such critique 
                                                
31 W3:vii. 
32 Also somewhat pejoratively identified as the method of the church.  W3:19. 
33 Also labeled at some points, though not consistently, as inquiry or reasoning.  For example, W3:15, 
W3:19. 
34 W3:24. 
35 W3:25. 
36 W3:25. 
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would be based in the value of reason.  However, despite being unable to penetrate 
stubborn adherence to irrationality, it is still possible to criticize this method on a basis 
which should be intelligible even to its adherents: obstinacy with respect to beliefs simply 
does not work.37  If it did, its ease would recommend it and there could be no valid 
objection, for any such objection would originate in the principle that logic is preferable 
to illogic, a principle clearly rejected by those who attempt to maintain their beliefs by 
obstinacy.38  Practically, however, obstinacy comes up against recalcitrant experience 
rather quickly.  As Peirce puts it, thecause of failure is that different people have 
different opinions and the man who sees this begins to feel uncertain.39  Uncertainty 
leads us from the comfortable state of belief into that of doubt, thereby undermining the 
effectiveness of obstinacy as a method of settling opinion. 
 Peirce theorizes that recognition of the lack of utility exhibited by the method of 
obstinacy may lead one to the view that since within every epistemic community we 
influence one anothers opinions, the thing to do is fix belief, not in the individual 
merely, but in the community.40 This can be accomplished by permitting the business of 
belief-formation to be a business for the state, rather than the individual  hence Peirces 
label, despotism.  He observes, perhaps somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that in nations with 
despotic rulers or ruling bodies, When complete agreement could not otherwise be 
reached, a general massacre of all who have not thought in a certain way, has proved to 
be a very effective means of settling opinion.41  Peirce also claims that this method has 
historically played a prominent role in upholding theological and political doctrines, 
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citing Rome as his example.42  Despite the cruelty and atrocity that he ascribes to 
despotism, Peirce readily admits that we must allowits immeasurable mental and 
moral superiority to the method of obstinacy.43  He supports this statement by empirical 
means, claiming that the success of despotism is proportionately greater than that of 
obstinacy; in fact, he claims that it has worked majestic results in a certain sense  
creating great works of architecture and ingenuity or, more convincing still, systems that 
have lasted to the point of being defined as epochs.44  Peirce even goes so far as to say 
that For the mass of mankindthere is perhaps no better method than this.45 
Still, aside from concerns about the aforementioned cruelty and atrocity46, 
despotism has two additional weaknesses.  Firstly, to force people by fire and sword to 
adopt ones belief is simply not practicable in our days47; and secondly, even if it were 
still a viable method of fixing belief for the masses, no institution can undertake to 
regulate belief upon every subject.48  Like that of obstinacy, the method of despotism is 
flawed in that it cannot effectively override the force of immediate experience  or at 
least, not on all topics, not without considerable effort, and not by the methods once used 
to propagate institutional beliefs so efficiently. 
                                                
42 It should be noted that this example does not have a great deal of historical substantiation, but rather that 
Peirce introduces it as if it ought to be self evident and further remarks that despotism is the method in use 
wherever there is a priesthood.  W3:26. 
43 W3:26. 
44 W3:26. 
45 W3:27. 
46 One might be alarmed at how quickly Peirce appears to have swept this concern aside, save for the fact 
that he is building towards an ultimate rejection of all methods save inquiry when it comes to the business 
of pursuing truth  one such truth, one would be tempted to say, is that despotism is cruel and atrocious. 
47 W3:15. 
48 W3:27. 
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 What Peirce does view as successful in our day  most successful, in fact  is the 
method of public opinion, which he presents as a modified version of despotism. 49  This 
achieves much the same result as the method of despotism, in that it fixes belief on a 
community-wide basis.  The main point of contrast is that it does so not by the use of 
force, but by oratory and preaching and by fostering certain sentiments and passions in 
the minds of the young.50  Such practices lead to the development of a relatively unified 
body of doctrine within communities, so this method is scarcely less effective at 
eliminating opposing opinions than is despotism.51  Peirce suggests that unifying public 
opinion is so highly successful within communities that [t]raditional belief remains 
undisturbed until one community comes in contact with another.52 
The problem of intercommunity discourse clearly acts as a stumbling block for 
the method of public opinion.  As Peirce puts it, different communities, removed from 
mutual influence, will develop very different bodies of doctrine.53  The intersection of 
such competing bodies of doctrine inevitably leads to conflict, as each belief community 
involved is forced to either take up the method of obstinacy with respect to its preferred 
opinions or to engage in genuine discourse that will inevitably lead to doubt regarding the 
veracity of cherished presuppositions.  This is likely true even more so today than in 
Peirces time, as the proliferation of the modern scientific worldview reaches parts of 
human civilization previously untouched by competing ideals.54  Thus, like obstinacy and 
despotism, the method of public opinion can fix belief only in circumstances so narrow 
                                                
49 W3:15. 
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52 W3:19. 
53 W3:17. 
54 Arguably, Nietzsches Twilight of the Idols has proved prescient in identifying this phenomenon. 
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that the influence of experience of anything wider than ones own community can be 
disregarded. 
Having demonstrated the failure of the three methods described above to actually 
fix belief and stave off doubt in any lasting way, Peirce introduces us to the last method 
discussed in the draft chapters of his book on logic: that of reasoning, inquiry, or 
scientific investigation.55  He is quick to point out that this method is naturally unpopular, 
so much so that it will never be adopted when any of the others will succeed.56  Despite 
the instinctual animosity felt towards it by the mass of mankind, who quite sensibly 
prefer the sensation of belief to that of doubt and desire to avoid deliberately engaging in 
a course of analysis that may offer a good deal more doubt than the alternatives, scientific 
investigation has one great advantage: it fixes belief more surely.57  Inquiry attains its 
privileged status in Peirces account because of its methodological merits, which make it 
uniquely utile in the processes of human flourishing.  Investigation alone leads 
ultimately to a conclusion not dependent on the initial condition of belief58, because 
investigation alone connects belief to reality.59 
Peirce recognizes at this stage that his case is in-the-making rather than made, and 
is quick to acknowledge the presuppositions of his view.  For example, he acknowledges 
that the notion of a belief that accurately allows us to navigate the real world presupposes 
a real world, the existence of which he adroitly argues is a well-supported hypothesis.  
The method of inquiry and the conception of reality on which it is based remain ever in 
harmony, which precludes the sorts of doubts that arise so quickly when one attempts to 
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fit any of the other methods to ones experience.60  Peirce also remarks that the notion 
that there is some one thing to which a proposition should conform is admitted by 
every mind, and supports further the hypothesis that there is a reality for beliefs to be 
about.61  Most significantly, scientific investigation has had the most wonderful 
triumphs in the way of settling opinion.62  Simply put, it can do what the other methods 
discussed cannot.  Peirce goes on to say that [t]o describe the method of scientific 
investigation is the object of this book63  a book that sadly was never completed, let 
alone published.  Fortunately, the ideas begun in these early drafts did eventually take 
shape, and we have another source for Peirces thoughts on the method of inquiry to turn 
to. 
2.3.2 The Fixation of Belief: Strengthening the Case for Inquiry 
 Peirce scholars often divide his thought into phases, with the period encompassing 
the 1870s and much of the 1880s represented by some as a logico-mathematical or 
methodological period.64 Given the unity of purpose that underlies the development of 
Peirces thought during this phase, it is not surprising that he returns to the same themes 
on a number of occasions  indeed, it is what one would expect of an system emerging 
organically, where advances in one area require clarification or elucidation elsewhere in 
order to keep the whole coherent.  Such is the case five years after the drafts of his logic 
book, where in the published version of The Fixation of Belief we find Peirce still 
committed to the essential elements of the four methods described above.  What differs is 
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the inclusion of an additional method, the collapse of two previously separate methods 
into a single one, as well as the titles assigned to those methods and the degree to which 
Peirce develops each method, finally offering an assessment of each in relation to the 
others and to the goal of acquiring truth.  
This considerably more refined account of the process of belief fixation 
emphasizes the importance of logic and the primacy of reasoning.  Logic, Peirce wishes 
to remind us, is not a natural gift  in fact, he suggests that the faculty of drawing 
inferences is the last to achieve full development in human beings.65  Despite this 
limitation of human nature, Peirce contends that each chief step in science has been a 
lesson in logic66; in other words, that reasoning well has been the primary vehicle by 
which our knowledge of the world has been able to advance.  Still, in the absence of any 
facts to go upon we are happy and self-satisfied.67  Unencumbered by reason in such 
circumstances, we are extravagant optimists who are led to reason only through the 
effects of experience.68  This familiar thesis echoes the message of Peirces logic book 
drafts and leads into a similar, though more developed, discussion of the fixation of 
belief. 
Peirce begins by introducing the process of inquiry: it is brought on by the 
irritation of doubt, while leads to the struggle to attain certainty, and ends when doubt has 
been alleviated and a state of belief has been achieved.  But Peirce is quick to point out 
that the struggle of inquiry is only ever begun because of the motive of doubt; else we are 
cheerful dogmatists who cling tenaciously not merely to believing, but to believing just 
                                                
65 W3:242. 
66 W3:243. 
67 W3:245. 
68 W3:245. 
 19
what we do believe.69  This being the case, one might wonder how we ever come to 
believe what is true.  Peirce sets out to demonstrate that inquiry is the only path to true 
belief by performing something of a reductio.  He sets out the competing methods of 
tenacity, authority, and a priori rationalism with examples and elucidation, all towards 
the end of showing that inquiry is the only sure method for the fixation of belief. 
As in Towards a Logic Book, Peirce begins with the method of fixing belief 
that is arguably most popular and certainly most convenient: tenacity.70  If acquiring 
opinions is the only object of inquiry71, and having beliefs is like having certain habits, 
why not just solve questions by selecting an answer and repeating it to ourselves, further 
validating its claim to our defense by exposing ourselves only to evidence in its favour 
until it becomes so firmly entrenched in our minds that naught will move us to doubt its 
veracity?  Indeed, Peirce says that This simple and direct method is really pursued by 
many men.72  It may even be deliberately adopted, as when one knows that a cherished 
belief may be forced into revision if certain information is addressed, and so one avoids 
being exposed to that information.  In such cases, the peace of mind achieved by refusing 
even the possibility of doubt is so attractive that any inconvenience suffered by clinging 
to it is deemed to be worth the attainment of a steady and immovable faith.73 
If all that we could assess was the inner state of the believing subject  whether 
she is more inclined to doubt and discovery or belief for the sake of belief  Peirce thinks 
that we could make no judgment against her for adhering to the method of tenacity.  To 
do so would amount to no more than saying that her chosen first principles differ from 
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ours: she has chosen to be irrational, so telling her that she should be rational will get us 
nowhere.74  Yet even though the person who adopts this method will not allow that its 
inconveniences are greater than its advantages75, that this is so can be empirically 
verified.  Tenacity is unable to hold its ground in practice, as one inevitably runs up 
against the opinions of others or fails to succeed in significant courses of action in such a 
way as to introduce doubt, despite the agents best efforts to avoid it. 
When tenacity fails because the opinions of others impinge upon one as 
significant, realization that their beliefs might be as important as ones own comprises a 
distinctly new step, and a highly important one.76  That important step leads us to the 
problem of how to fix belief for a community, a challenge answered by the method of 
authority.  One possible authority is the church, another is the state.77  Institutionalizing 
the right to choose beliefs for the community is a means of enforcing agreement and 
keeping contrary beliefs from being formed.78  Again, despite the cruelties associated 
with this most ruthless power79, Peirce maintains that the method of authority has 
mental and moral superiority over the method of tenacity - basically, because it gets 
things done.  Nor are most people particularly troubled by their governing institutions 
demand to submit to authority.  Regarding this portion of humanity, Peirce declares 
scornfully that [i]f it is their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves, then slaves they 
ought to remain.80  
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One might be surprised that Peirce is so permissive regarding the method of 
authority, but this acceptance is based solely on its practicability, which he ultimately 
finds unsatisfying.81  Despite the great success that institutions have historically had in 
fixing opinion on important matters, no institution can propose to fix belief on every 
matter.  Rather, what are taken to be the pressing questions of the day are adjudicated 
upon by the authoritative body, and for the remainder each individual is left to go her 
own way.  Overall, this succeeds best when there is no interaction between communities 
governed by different authorities, but even though intercommunity discourse is the 
quickest path to the rejection of authority, intracommunity discourse can undermine it in 
a similar fashion, if somewhat slower.  Once a few individuals begin to critically assess 
the dogma espoused by their governing authority, it becomes apparent that the beliefs of 
their community are accidental, rather than universal; and the method of authority will 
inevitably be rejected in favour of another that does not suffer from this flaw.82 
Doubt regarding the caprice of beliefs held by others or oneself leads to a third 
method, and one which appears for the first time in The Fixation of Belief: the method 
of a priori rationalism.  This third way proposes to let the action of natural preferences 
be unimpededand under their influence let men, conversing together and regarding 
manners in different lights, gradually develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes.83  
While it is the conflict of ones own opinions with the opinions of others that leads one 
into this method, its goal is not merely to resettle ones own opinions, but to achieve a 
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consensus.  Hence, the beliefs that are arrived at become privileged not because of their 
veracity, but because of their acceptability within the belief community.  This means that 
a priori rationalism can provide a group of people with a much more stable belief set than 
those which would be arrived at by individual processes based on submission to authority 
or tenacious adherence to cherished conceptions.  In addition to resolving 
intracommunity differences, the a priori method of discerning reasonable from 
unreasonable beliefs also offers a means of reconciling intercommunity disputes, as it 
grants no precedence to any belief on the basis of who espouses it.  It relies instead on 
rational analysis that is available to believers in all communities.  Peirce views these 
benefits as considerable, and proclaims the method of popular opinion far more 
intellectual and respectable than the methods of tenacity and authority.84 
Despite the elevated station Peirce grants the a priori method due to its 
employment of reason, he judges that its failure has been the most manifest.85  
Rationalism is meant to prevent the formation of capricious opinions on the basis of 
accidental factors, but still produces beliefs that are arguably the result of preferences or 
intellectual fashions.  No connection to any aspect of the external world is assured, and as 
such, it is possible that one might wind up with a reasonable and consistent set of beliefs 
that nonetheless bear no relation to any facts and subsequently prove quite useless in the 
day-to-day business faced by believers.86  Ultimately, this means that rationalism is no 
great improvement over authority: instead of institutional authority, it is the authority of 
popular culture.  Rather than a product of pure reasoning, the beliefs formed by its 
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application are a product of reasoning in conjunction with a contingent set of 
circumstances.  Peirce suggests that within the wider community of epistemic agents, 
there will be at least a few who will recognize that even with the application of a priori 
reasoning, which is by far the most legitimate method heretofore, at least some of their 
beliefs are produced by accidental causes and thus are doubtful.  The doubts raised by the 
awareness that other, competing beliefs might be as reasonable as ones own leads to the 
rejection of this method and sparks the search for one that can produce beliefs that will 
survive the tests of both rational acceptability and experience.  As Peirce says, To satisfy 
our doubtsit is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be 
caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency  by something upon which 
our thinking has no effect.87 
 Peirces candidate for such a system is the final method discussed in The 
Fixation of Belief: scientific inquiry.  In order for this method to be operative, one has to 
accept what Peirce terms a fundamental hypothesis, which is that there are real things 
whose characters are quite independent of our opinions about them, but by which our 
faculties of perception are affected in accordance with regular laws.88  This, then, is the 
great virtue of inquiry: performed correctly, we can determine via reasoning how things 
really are.89  Also, because beliefs formed in the application of this method connect to 
real states of affairs, no doubts regarding inquiry arise during its practice  which is a 
marked difference from the other methods assessed.  The efficacy of beliefs formed via 
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tenacity, authority, and rationalism can all be challenged by recalcitrant experience. By 
contrast, since it incorporates experience, the test of the method of inquiry lies in its 
application: good reasoning leads to steadily fixed beliefs that are well-connected with 
reality and bad reasoning to beliefs that will be susceptible to doubt.  That inquiry is 
preferable as a method is supported, Peirce says, by the observation that everyone uses 
scientific method as much as possible.  While Peirce makes this assertion baldly, a simple 
survey of everyday modern methods supports his claim.  For example, it is nearly 
inconceivable that advances in a field like medicine could be made by the application of 
tenacity, authority, or rationalism  unless by sheer accident.90  Finally, the last and most 
practically significant point of praise that Peirce offers for inquiry is that it has the most 
wonderful triumphs in settling opinion.91  Once settled by genuine investigation, a belief 
is highly resistant to doubt, especially from such sources as authority or popular opinion.  
There is, Peirce concludes, no living doubt about the method of scientific inquiry.92 
Given the success and supportability of inquiry, we might well wonder why 
Peirce discusses the other methods at all, and in particular why he finds aspects of their 
application praiseworthy.  The reason for this is that each of the other methods has some 
tangible advantage over scientific investigation, a particular convenience of it its own.93  
Tenacity has the advantages of simplicity and directness, and given the sometimes 
tortuous discomfort that accompanies doubt in the process of inquiry, It is impossible 
not to envy the man who can dismiss reason, although we all know how it must turn out 
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at last.94  Similarly, submitting to authority is a great comfort for many people, 
particularly the peaceful and sympathetic, who find it irresistible.95  A priori 
rationalism might be especially appealing, as it has the bulwark of reason from whence to 
defend its conclusions, which are quite comfortable and unlikely ever to be seriously 
challenged by beliefs achieved through tenacity or authority. 
Despite their particular advantages; however, the problem underlying all three 
methods  which is solved by inquiry  is that after all, [one] wishes [ones] opinions to 
coincide with the fact, and there is no reason to suppose that this result could be 
achieved by any method save scientific investigation.96  Because of its unique 
effectiveness in the employment of reason and experience, we should allow the reflective 
processes essential to inquiry their full weight.  Peirce holds that though one might expect 
to experience a greater quantity of doubt in the pursuance of scientifically fixed beliefs, 
their steadiness and near immovability once achieved is worth the struggle.  He ends the 
discussion of inquiry in this paper with a strong prescription for believers: above all, let 
it be considered that what is more wholesome than any particular belief is integrity of 
belief, andto avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn 
out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous.97  What Peirce is saying here is 
that there is no belief that cannot be treated as a hypothesis of scientific inquiry, no belief 
that can attain protected status.  Given that his account to this point has been largely 
descriptive, it is clear that we have now come to the real crux of Peirces position on 
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belief, that regarding which he feels strongly enough to offer normative claims.  The 
message is this: the only road to the security of knowledge is inquiry. 
 Clearly, though the prose is polished and the connections between methods of 
belief fixation more eloquently presented, the account presented in The Fixation of 
Belief is a continuation of rather than a move away from Peirces early views in 
Towards a Logic Book.  Later, in assessing the possible problems and provisos for the 
would-be Peircean, it will become apparent that Peirce remains true to the 
epistemological foundations laid in his industrious methodological phase for the 
remainder of his intellectual life.  At this point; however, the appropriate place to turn is 
to the ramifications of Peirces insistence on scientific inquiry as the method absoluta for 
the fixation of belief.  The result of the primacy of inquiry is that belief, on Peirces view, 
is fundamentally connected to both action and truth. 
2.4 Belief & Action 
Beliefs, according to Peirce, are the foundation for habits of action.  Regarding 
any proposition that we may consider, either we do not actually conceive that proposition 
and our actions are unconcerned by that proposition, or we conceive of the proposition 
and act as if we had some belief.98  And when we do believe, there is a proposition in 
our minds which determines our conduct according to rule, so that our belief being 
known the way in which we shall behave may be surely deduced.99 
Regarding any particular belief, if one had in its place a doubt, she would behave 
differently.  Consider again our two students of ancient philosophy: the one who is well-
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prepared behaves as if she is in possession of certain beliefs regarding the subject matter 
of her test; indeed, on that matter she possesses a belief set which is likely highly 
consistent and she acts accordingly, with confidence and certitude.  If some experience  
say, a discussion immediately before the test with the top student in the class wherein that 
student expresses markedly different beliefs regarding the test material  had caused our 
well-prepared student to have her beliefs supplanted by doubts, we would expect to see 
her behave more like her poorly prepared classmate.  On Peirces account, this is so 
because in a state of belief one sees the believed proposition to be fact, and one will 
always act a certain way in accordance with that fact.  Doubt cannot produce any such 
purposive behaviour, as there are no underlying facts to base ones actions upon, let alone 
sufficient reason to develop a habit of behaviour. 
For Peirce, the development of habitual behaviours is the logical consequence of 
adherence to a steadily fixed belief.  Because it is logical, in Peirces view, it is binding: 
if we have applied reasoning in the acquisition of our beliefs, we should conclude also 
that those beliefs have a basis in fact and as such are appropriate not merely as guidelines, 
but as rules for action.  Consequently, a change in our experience that alters a previously 
fixed belief  either replacing it with doubt or with a new, more satisfying belief  will 
always be accompanied by a change in behaviour.  If the student who took herself to be 
well-prepared was forced to accept otherwise, we would observe the change in behaviour 
described above.  Peirce expects that this will always be the case when we are operating 
as responsible epistemic agents, as action is always predicated on belief, either in light of 
it or as a result of its lack, as when one acts out of doubt to attain a state of belief.  
Unsuccessful actions based on ill-conceived or erroneous beliefs are the vehicle for 
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realizing change within ones belief set, as one comes to realize that such beliefs are 
unhelpful; and they are unhelpful for the most obvious reason: they are not true. 
2.5 Belief & Truth 
 In her influential analysis of Peirce on truth, Cheryl Misak argues convincingly 
that Peirce held truth to be both an essentially pragmatic business and the ultimate aim of 
inquiry.  As she says, Peirces construal of truth is not an analytic definition of truth, but 
a distinctly pragmatic elucidationIt is an account of the relationship between truth and 
inquiry.100  The discussion above serves to support this point  doubt incites inquiry and 
inquiry is the best road to true beliefs  but further remarks are necessary here. 
 Misak describes Peirces account of truth in relation to inquiry as having the form 
of a conditional.  This conditional has the form if, if inquiry relevant to [a proposition] 
were to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go, then [the proposition] would be 
believed, then [the proposition] is true.101  But this is problematic, as we might well 
think that any method whereby beliefs can be fixed permanently would do, and we can 
readily imagine such methods that would fix beliefs in no way corresponding to truths.102  
But these sorts of objections implode quickly when we recall Peirces adamant 
requirement that we ought to reflect to rightly inquire, which means that inquiry is a 
process that can proceed only in good faith.  When that requirement is met, the sorts of 
objections that can be made to Peirces account of truth clearly fail to meet the 
methodological standard of inquiry. Peirce has already argued quite forcefully that no 
method save inquiry can be expected to produce true beliefs, and so the connection 
between scientific investigation and the production of true beliefs stands up quite well to 
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the objection that any method of fixing belief permanently could fulfill Peirces truth 
requirements.  As Misak elucidates, When we have beliefs that would forever withstand 
the tests of experience and argument, what is the point of refusing to confer upon them 
the title true?  The pragmatist says there is no point at all.103  This captures Peirces 
position precisely, as what he has to say on this matter is that anyone with enough 
experience, applying the laws of logic correctly, will be led to the one true 
conclusion.104 
Though we might like to imagine that the quest for certainty occurring in the 
process of inquiry is always a quest for truth, Peirce is quick to rebuke us on this point: 
the goal of inquiry is not  or at least, not always  the achievement of true opinion.  
Truth is the aim only of ideal inquiry; falsely motivated or less than scrupulous inquiry 
might profess to aim at the truth, but aims merely at attaining or protecting ones 
favoured belief.  After all, Peirce is adamant that the sole object of inquiry is the 
settlement of opinion.105  Thus, Peirce acknowledges that we do not always act as ideal 
inquirers; indeed, sometimes we are merely survivors and our belief formation processes 
follow one of the other three methods described rather than inquiry.  Furthermore, Peirce 
does not seem to think that we should be judged harshly for acquiring belief by means 
other than inquiry, unless our aim is to discover truths.  Functionally, Peirce cheerfully 
concedes that we do have beliefs that do not aim at the truth; nonetheless, ideally as 
inquirers we should strive towards the acquisition only of beliefs that are true. 
                                                
103 Truth and the End of Inquiry, 47. 
104 W3:254. 
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3. Contradictions & Conundrums 
A newcomer to Peircean territory would be well advised to take note of the 
following point: Peirces thought is evolutionary; perhaps even radically so.106  French 
Peirce biographer Gérard Deledalle remarks that his writings must be studied 
chronologically if they are not to appear incomprehensible or contradictory.107  This is 
particularly true when one is trying to forge connections between works from the latter 
part of Peirces life and the relatively unified middle phase, as late in life Peirce takes on 
topics that had been largely neglected in the development of his logic and metaphysics.108  
While this may not quiet all critics who claim that entering the Peircean architectonic is 
like traipsing into a philosophical bog, it is revelatory when one considers the fairly 
regular occurrence of apparent contradictions.  Generally speaking, these contradictions 
are not symptomatic of any deep disunity within the body of Peirces work, but rather, 
mark the natural development of a system that was under constant revision for nearly 
fifty years. 
Even though understanding this evolutionary character is certainly a key to 
reading Peirce accurately, it cannot be expected to excuse all instances of apparent 
contradiction.  With the relatively recent publication of the 1898 Cambridge Conference 
lecture series and the 1903 Harvard Lectures109, it has come to light that statements 
                                                
106 This is true in two senses: firstly, Peirces thought is evolutionary in the sense that it is contemporaneous 
with and heavily influenced by Darwinian theory.  Secondly, and as I mean it in this context, Peirces 
thought is evolutionary in the sense that it progresses over time in much the same way that biological 
evolution does, with periods of constancy punctuated by episodes of change.  Consider that Peirce made the 
journey from nominalism to realism, and from Kant to Aristotle to Duns Scotus to his own triadic logic.  
Such transitions are not minor revisions, but serious attempts to reframe his own philosophy in the quest for 
a logical system. 
107 Deledalle, Charles S. Peirce: An Intellectual Biography, p.xxxi. 
108 An example of such a case is his 1908 Neglected Argument for the Existence of God, published in the 
Hibbert Journal. 
109 The Cambridge lectures were published in 1992, the Harvard lectures in 1997. 
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regarding belief occur within Peirces later epistemology which may be contrary to the 
seemingly complete account just presented. What is at stake here is the legitimacy of my 
earlier claim that Peirces account of belief represents a continuous cornerstone in his 
epistemology.  In order to defend that claim, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the 
remarks made by Peirce during his late lectures series do not actually mark a schism in 
his epistemological thought and can be satisfactorily reconciled with his earlier account. 
3.1 The 1898 Cambridge Conference Lectures 
 The lectures Peirce gave at Cambridge in the winter of 1898 were significant to 
him for at least two reasons.  At the time, the most prominent of these would have been 
the remuneration for their presentation, as the cost of maintaining both his estate in 
Milford, Pennsylvania, and care for his wife in New York had rendered Peirce financially 
destitute.110  The other reason explicitly expressed by Peirce in his correspondence with 
William James was that it allowed Peirce an opportunity to make his work known to the 
academic community  that elite section of society which he was born into111, but 
systematically denied access to in his own career.  Though there is considerable evidence 
that James had more topical influence on the series than Peirce would have liked, it can 
be discerned from numerous remarks from Peirce on topics closer to James heart than to 
his own that Peirce  while keeping more or less to the guidelines James had urged upon 
him  managed to keep his lectures very much an expression of his own views.112  
                                                
110 In a letter to James on January 15th, 1898, Peirce wrote to touch upon the delicate question of 
moneymy wife asking me to do so for strong reasons.  RLT, Introduction:29. 
111 Peirces paternal grandfather, Benjamin Peirce, was Librarian of Harvard for five years; his father, 
Benjamin Peirce, Jr,. was a towering figure on the Harvard campus and one of the most respected 
mathematicians of his day. (RLT, Introduction:3) 
112 An example of Peirce disparaging a topic dear to James heart is his treatment of James  so-called vital 
matters, which he dismisses as simply not the occupation of the philosopher.  In philosophy, Peirce 
claimed, the person who doesnt stand aloof from the urgency of finding what is utile for everyday affairs 
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Amongst the topics discussed in some detail we find Peirces epistemology, and 
specifically, his account of belief.  It is to the latter than I now turn, wherein we find 
some worrisome developments. 
 The first lecture in the Cambridge series, given by Peirce on February 10, is titled 
Philosophy and the Conduct of Life, but any listener who came expecting to hear how 
the former guides the latter was doomed to disappointment.  Peirce is quick to distance 
himself from the view that unites the study of dialectic and virtuous living, which he 
traces back to Plato.113  In fact, much of the business of this first lecture is to separate 
philosophy from the processes of moving around in the world: in this respect, Peirce 
says, I stand before you an Aristotelian and a scientific man, condemning with the whole 
strength of conviction the Hellenistic tendency to mingle Philosophy and Practice.114  It 
is the tendency to mingle philosophy and practice  inherited from Plato - that Peirce 
feels is responsible for contemporary errors in philosophy.  Though he acknowledges that 
the instincts that lead us to engage in moral theorizing are more important to everyday 
life than a true love of science, Peirce is adamant that the methods that guide us 
through our daily life are radically unfitting for scientific investigation.115  This thesis 
clearly harkens back to his discussion of the methods of belief fixation, where we are told 
that the methods acceptable for most daily matters are completed unsuited to the pursuit 
of truth, which can be successfully embarked upon only via inquiry. 
 The problem that stems from the comparison between that early account and this 
new emphasis on the separation between science and daily life is that the former seems to 
                                                                                                                                            
will not only obstruct the advance of the pure science, but what is infinitely worse, he will endanger his 
own moral integrity and that of his readers.  RLT, 1:107. 
113 RLT, 1:106. 
114 RLT, 1:107. 
115 RLT, 1:107. 
 33
depict an analysis leading to the primacy of scientific inquiry as a method of belief 
formation ideally appropriate in all possible applications, while the latter seems to 
describe two completely different types of belief, each best arrived at via a particular 
method.  On this interpretation, reasoning is appropriate in matters of science, where 
impartiality is necessary to make any real progress; but instinct is what does  and ought 
 guide us through the business of daily life.  In science, right reason rules and right 
sentiment knows it  if we try theses in science on the basis of instinct, we hold 
ourselves ready to throw them overboard at a moments notice from experience.116  But 
reason also dictates allowing supremacy of sentiment in daily human affairs.  This leads 
to an apparent contradiction: in The Fixation of Belief, we are strictly abjured to act as 
inquirers insofar as we are capable, applying reason as widely as possible; in Philosophy 
and the Conduct of Life, we are being told that reason is applicable only in the very 
limited arena of pure science.  So how are we to fix belief: through the application of 
reason as much as possible, or by instinct the vast majority of the time? 
  Peirce has an answer for this, though it might not be what one would expect: I 
hold that what is properly and usually called belief, that is, the adoption of a proposition 
asa possession for all timehas no place in science at all.117  As such, it appears that 
what is fixed by scientific inquiry of the sort detailed in Peirces early epistemology is not 
belief at all.  This apparently marks a major schism between that early epistemology and 
the view Peirce is presenting in the Cambridge lectures.  We have already seen that 
Peirces early account of belief not only appears internally consistent, but also has 
explanatory value in connection with other major epistemological notions, such as truth.  
                                                
116 RLT, 1:112. 
117 RLT, 1:112. 
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What, then, could have prompted Peirce to later embrace an apparently contrary 
conception of belief? 
 The simplest possible answer is that in the twenty years elapsed between the 
works under examination, Peirce radically changed his views; however, even a brief 
survey supports the existence of strands of continuity in the evolution of Peirces 
epistemology.  For instance, his comments on scientific inquiry and the nature of 
philosophy as a science are highly complementary, so long as one is not trying to 
reconcile the beliefs formed by scientific inquiry as described in The Fixation of Belief 
with the so-called no belief in science thesis advanced here.  Still, we cannot avoid the 
fact that there is something odd happening here: Peirce has made a transition from talking 
of beliefs formed by scientific inquiry to declaring that there is no proposition at all in 
science which answers to the conception of belief.118  What now needs to be discerned is 
whether these remarks are unfortunate one-offs that are best ignored as mere by-products 
of the discussion of the classification of the sciences detailed in Philosophy and the 
Conduct of Life, or whether they marks an intentional addendum to Peirces original 
theory of belief. 
 Given that their subject matter includes logic and reasoning, which Peirce 
considers the foundation of science, the most obvious place to check for further mention 
of the no belief in science thesis is in the rest of the Cambridge lectures, and in fact, the 
theme of the role of belief in science does reappear  most prominently, in Peirces fourth 
lecture, The First Rule of Logic.  That first rule is Peirces celebrated injunction to 
philosophers:  Do not block the way of inquiry.119  What is less well known is that 
                                                
118 RLT, 1:112. 
119 RLT, 4:178. 
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Peirce arrives at his first rule by addressing the nature of scientific investigation as it 
compares to practice. 
 He begins The First Rule of Logic with a reminder about the fallibility of 
inferential processes, which applies to all sorts of inquiry, though inference is nonetheless 
self-correcting over time.  Peirce claims that induction and deduction are actually quite 
similar  it is the knowledge of uniformity that makes it possible to limit deductive 
inquiries to a single experiment120, while inductive inquiries call for multiple 
experiments.121  By contrast, retroductive inquiries, as an example of which Peirce cites 
the developing theory of evolution, are theatres of controversy which involve both 
experimental research and eventual surrender to the Insistence of an Idea which is 
irresistible and imperative.122  In all cases, what makes science a genuine pursuit of 
knowledge is a hearty and active desire to learn what is true  an attitude that Peirce 
labels The Will to Learn.123  Correct application of the will to learn requires the 
admission that we do not know something; that we wish to know it; and that we make a 
genuine effort to find out about it.124  Nevertheless, Peirce maintains that the application 
of this will in science still does not allow for belief in science, remarking that 
retroductive [i.e. experimental] inference is not a matter for belief at all.125 
 In harkening back to the thesis he advances in lecture one of the Cambridge 
series, Peirce acknowledges that it seems to generate a problem: When I say that a 
                                                
120 The sort of experiment that Peirce describes as part of the process of deductive reasoning is not 
empirical, but more in the mode of a thought experiment. 
121 RLT, 4:169. 
122 RLT, 4:169-170. 
123 RLT, 4:170.  This is clearly a jab at William James, who had recently published The Will to Believe, 
which he dedicated to Peirce and which begins a sustained history of James misinterpreting Peircean 
doctrines while simultaneously pledging intellectual allegiance to Peirce. 
124 RLT, 4:172. 
125 RLT, 4:176. 
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retroductive inference is not a matter for belief at all, I encounter the difficulty that there 
are certain inferences which scientifically considered are undoubtedly hypotheses and yet 
which practically are perfectly certain.126  In more basic terms, science sometimes 
produces hypotheses so well-supported as to seem facts themselves, with respect to which 
a state of belief seems not only reasonable, but advisable.  Peirce acknowledges that such 
hypotheses can function as facts in practice, but maintains that this does not undermine 
his thesis that in a scientific context, no fact or complex of facts can be considered solid 
ground.  Science never stands upon the bedrock of fact, but walks upon a bog, and 
can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present.127  Because of the essentially 
disinterested attitude required for scientific investigation, one can never assert that a 
proposition is a fact, but may at most adhere to it as if it were.  Thus, Peirce says, science 
take an entirely different attitude toward facts from that which Practice takes.128  And 
the fact that science itself can produce what Peirce terms extra-scientific certainty - 
while vitally important to practice - does not change the mandate, process, or position of 
science with respect to belief.  Belief is still no concern of science which has nothing at 
stake on any temporal venture, but is in pursuit of eternal verities.129  Rather, the kind of 
practical holding for true that can properly be called belief belongs only to practice, 
while science proceeds also by holding certain propositions as true, but only ever in a 
strictly provisional sense.130 
 The additional comments on belief and science provided in The First Rule of 
Reason serve both to illuminate the comments made in Philosophy and the Conduct of 
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Life and to support the thesis that the view expressed therein is neither accidental nor 
casually held.  At a minimum, it can be concluded that for at least the purposes and 
duration of the Cambridge Conference lectures, Peirce is committed to the view that 
belief has no place in pure science, including philosophy. 
3.2 The 1903 Harvard Lectures 
 Further investigation reveals that the Cambridge lectures are not the only forum 
wherein Peirce advances a firm divide between philosophy and practice, with belief being 
the sole province of the latter.  Clarification on Peirces view on the role of belief in 
science is presented in his second major lecture series, given at Harvard in 1903.  Like 
the Cambridge series, the Harvard lectures had significance to Peirce, and again for two 
reasons.  It is lamentable that one of these was once more their pecuniary value, as Peirce 
yet again found himself in serious financial straits.  He had hoped to secure funding from 
the newly formed Carnegie Institution, which he applied for on the basis of a proposal to 
write memoirs presenting his logic in its entirety.131  Assessment of Peirces proposal 
was initially deferred132, and later denied, as the Institution ultimately decided to provide 
funding exclusively to work in the natural sciences, to which it evidently did not consider 
logic relevant.133  For Peirce scholars, the other reason is considerably more interesting 
and makes the Harvard lectures a candidate for close study, as it is here that Peirce firmly 
and clearly separates his own pragmatism from the doctrines championed under that label 
by others134, and gives it what is arguably its most systematic presentation.  In the course 
                                                
131 PPM, Introduction:1. 
132 In November of 1902.  Peirce accurately took this to be a denial of his request for funding.  PPM, 
Introduction:3. 
133 PPM, 5. 
134 Most significantly in this case, William James. 
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of the lectures, Peirce argues for the need of a logical basis for pragmatism, as well as 
entertaining a wide variety of topics to which it applies  including belief. 
 Peirce touches on belief in his introductory lecture, which he presents as a 
prolegomena to the remainder of the series.  In this first lecture, titled simply 
Introduction, Peirce proposes to refine the doctrine of pragmatism that he first 
advanced in 1878 in the Popular Science series.  He cites it as an advantage to be well 
imbued with pragmatism in the conduct of life  so we may deduce that the conduct of 
life is of interest to Peirce, and that it has significance beyond being merely that which is 
not science.135  However, he does emphasize the importance of understanding that 
pragmatism has a logical basis, remarking that In order to be admitted to better 
philosophical standing I have endeavoured to put pragmatism as I understand it into 
theform of a philosophical theorem.136  For our purposes here, the main interest is 
how that theorem is applied to the concept of belief.  Peirces pragmatic maxim, in a 
distilled form, says the following: any professed theoretical judgment has as its actual 
meaning not that the judgment is true in some Platonic sense, but that if it is taken to be 
true, then a certain practical maxim must follow.137  Belief, Peirce states, is a type of 
judgment that takes the form of assertion to oneself; so, like a verbal assertion, the 
meaning or content of a belief is revealed (and exhausted) by its practical 
consequences.138  What Peirce concludes with respect to belief is an obvious echo of his 
early formulations of the relationship between belief and action: There can, of course, be 
                                                
135 PPM, 1:109. 
136 PPM, 1:110. 
137 In Peirces own words: Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a 
sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its 
tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence with its apodosis 
in the imperative mood.  PPM, 1:110. 
138 PPM, 1:116-117. 
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no question that a man will act in accordance with his belief so far as his belief has any 
practical consequences.139  Again, what we think is to be interpreted in terms of what 
we are prepared to do.140  Given his interest in presenting a coherent and systematic 
view of his philosophy as seen in the lights of pragmatism, it should be no surprise to us 
that Peirce considers the notion of belief  so integral to inquiry, knowledge, and action  
as worthy of attention at numerous junctures in this mature presentation of his 
philosophy. 
Indeed, in addition to offering these comments on the nature of belief itself, Peirce 
revisits his account of belief formation practices, expounds upon the role of belief in 
science, and discusses the relationship between the two.  In the introductory lecture we 
are reminded that Peirces classification of the sciences presents mathematics and logic as 
the purest of sciences  those concerned not with action or everyday applicability.  As 
editor Partricia Ann Turisi puts it, Peirce frames pragmatism as a scientific doctrine 
belonging to the science of logic.141  In the practice of philosophy then, the true 
scientific investigator completely loses sight of the utility of what he is about.142  Unlike 
the conduct of life, science  including philosophy  is essentially divorced from action.  
Peirce is adamant about this separation, though he softens it by allowing that he does not 
mean that Philosophical science should not ultimately influence Religion and Morality, 
but merely that they should be allowed to do so only with secular slowness and the most 
conservative caution.143  The point here is quite clear: what is perfectly acceptable and 
worthy of inquiry and experimental assertion as a scientific hypothesis must spend some 
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time in practical purgatory before being adopted into to the class of genuine, action-
affecting belief.  Furthermore, in practical affairs  what Peirce here and elsewhere refers 
to as matters of vital importance144  nonscientific methods of attaining belief are 
perfectly acceptable.145  In fact, Peirce is once again poised to argue that they are the only 
methods suitable for everyday practice, which unfolds in decidedly unscientific ways. 
 After detailing his plans for the remainder of the series in Introduction, Peirce 
takes up the topic of belief and science in earnest in the second lecture, titled 
Phenomenology or The Doctrine of the Categories.  In this discussion of the 
origination of his ontological categories, we find that Peirce offers wholehearted approval 
for Ockhams razor, which abjures us to try always simpler hypotheses before more 
complex ones.  He remarks that There never was a sounder logical maxim of scientific 
procedure than Ockhams razor.146  Though this is significant praise from Peirce, who 
prized logical thinking most highly, he is quick to add a proviso: his approval of 
Ockhams principle of parsimony is limited to its efficacy as a scientific procedure.  Its 
usefulness is exhausted by science.  By contrast, in everyday affairs, If the question be 
what one ought to believe, the logic of the situation must take other factors into 
account.147  Peirce does not say what these other factors are, but he is intent on marking 
any situation where one is discerning what one ought to believe as being as far away as 
possible from the realm of science.  He presents the following rationale: Strictly 
speaking, Belief is out of place in pure theoretical science; so compared with living 
                                                
144 Though Peirces use of this phrase was at first somewhat satirical (at James expense), it appears to have 
become a useful label for him, as its adoption for the purpose of the Cambridge lectures marked the 
beginning of a sustained use of the term. 
145 We are guilty, Peirce says, of seriously overestimating the power of our abilities in applied logic (i.e. 
reasoning).  PPM, 1:110. 
146 PPM, 2:162. 
147 PPM, 2:162. 
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Belief, what we find in science is nothing but a ghost.148  Peirce anticipates the 
likelihood that his audience at Harvard would succumb to the temptation to make 
philosophy the exception, and precludes any line of reasoning headed in that direction by 
immediately adding that philosophy is a positive theoretical science, which has no 
more to do with belief than any other science.149 
 While these remarks surely would have perturbed ethicists, they are consistent 
with Peirces convictions regarding the foundational character of mathematics and logic.  
More importantly for our purposes, they are supremely consistent with the remarks 
regarding the role of belief in science that Peirce made in the Cambridge lectures five 
years earlier, which should lead us to the following conclusion: the Cambridge comments 
- whatever importance we might attach to them in an overall survery of Peirces 
epistemology - are not anomalous.  Given his repeated insistence on the importance of 
separating the science of philosophy from the conduct of everyday affairs and the 
repetition of the no belief in science thesis, it seems that what we have encountered is a 
new current in Peirces thought, or at least one whose importance emerges more clearly 
in the maturation of his philosophy.  Having established that Peirce not only said what he 
said about belief and science, but said it repeatedly and with some emphasis, we are still 
faced by the question of how to reconcile this new current with his previous  and 
relatively complete  account of belief.  
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3.3 The Science-Other Distinction & The Double Aspect Question 
The difficulty faced by the would-be Peircean150 as a result of the contradictory 
remarks introduced above is the following:  Peirce has presented us not just with a 
variegated account of belief, but with one that appears not to be practicable.  We are told 
both that scientific inquiry is the best way to fix belief, and that belief has no place in 
science.  This is clearly contradictory, and the result of trying to apply this account to 
ones practices as an epistemic agent would undoubtedly lead to conflict, if such a view a 
view could be coherently applied at all.  The question we face now is whether Peirce is 
making an intentional and purposive distinction between science and inquiring, including 
philosophy on the one hand; and other practices that properly involve attaining belief on 
the other.  What is at issue is whether the emergent science-other distinction Peirce 
advances in both of his later lecture series can be reconciled with his earlier 
epistemology, which described belief fixation across a spectrum, rather than as being of 
two kinds  practical and provisional.   
In the contemporary literature on Peirces view of belief, there are two prominent 
positions on what to do about this difficulty, each espousing different tactics for dealing 
with the apparent inconsistencies in the story Peirce tells.151  The first is what I will call 
the parsimonious Peircean position, which seeks to make Peirce intelligible via 
vigorous  but nonetheless, highly conscientious  editing.  Those who reject this 
revisionist strategy adopt what I will call the conservative Peircean position, which 
                                                
150 What I mean by this term is one who finds Peirces doctrines appealing and would like to adhere to 
them.  One might say that an orthodox Peircean is one who attempts to adhere to the package, while most 
contemporary philosophers would likely adopt certain doctrines and reject others.  The question of which 
doctrines are essential to count oneself a Peircean or a pragmatist is, of course, a matter for considerable 
debate. 
151 These are, of course, tactics adopted by those who wish to take something away from Peirce on the topic 
of belief.  Those who scorn pragmatism resolve the problem of Peirces apparent inconsistencies primarily 
by ignoring him altogether. 
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attempts to retain as much of the original Peircean material as possible and reconcile its 
disparities by way of attributing a highly complex theory to Peirce, one that casts 
believing as synonymous with holding for true, and the concept of belief itself as 
having a dual nature.  Scholars who assume the former position assure us that Peirce has 
a unitary theory of belief, confused by the occasional simply wacky statement, while 
those upholding the latter position reconcile Peirces early and late epistemological views 
by attributing to him a theory that presupposes some kind of duality within the concept of 
belief itself.  The question, then, is this: does the double aspect interpretation of Peirces 
conception of belief best resolve the apparent inconsistencies within his writings? 
Let us consider our candidates: the parsimonious Peircean position, represented 
by Cheryl Misak, which answers the double aspect question in the negative; and the 
conservative Peircean position, represented by Mark Migotti, which answers that same 
question in the positive.  This dispute is about more than a simple choice between 
preservation and parsimony, as Peirces ideas about belief are absolutely central to his 
system.  With this in mind, let us turn to an assessment of the two positions under 
consideration. 
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4. The Parsimonious Peircean Position 
 The intellectual hallmark of this position is a commitment to reading Peirce on 
belief in an editorial fashion, as the contradictions so far discussed are taken to be the 
result of inconsistency or carelessness on Peirces part, which produces a view best 
ignored.  Still, the essential elements of Peirces epistemology are taken to be a promising 
beginning, from which an account of belief that is both plausible and substantively 
Peircean can be constructed.  Thus, the optimal version of Peirces theory of belief is to 
be arrived at via excision of certain troublesome remarks which are in no way central, 
and in any case not conclusively damning, to Peirces account of belief or the larger 
picture of his epistemology.  This position has a number of advocates.  The revisionist 
attitude characteristic of the parsimonious position with respect to Peirces thought on 
belief originated at least as early as Harry Frankfurts 1958 article Peirces Account of 
Inquiry, where Frankfurt argues that Peirces account of inquiry  wherein belief plays 
such a large role  is confused and mistaken.152  A similar position is adopted by 
Christopher Hookway in his 1993 article Belief, Confidence and the Method of 
Science, where Hookway suggests that Peirces no belief in science thesis was a 
temporary lapse from philosophical good sense.153  However, as it is the most recent 
contemporary presentation of the issues that motivate a revisionist attitude towards 
Peirces work on belief, as well as one that meets an exemplary standard of the principles 
of clarity and charity, I will restrict my discussion here to the version of the parsimonious 
position advanced by Cheryl Misak in her 2002 article C.S. Peirce on Vital Matters.154 
                                                
152  PAI, 588. 
153 BCM, 3. 
154 This article first appeared in Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol.3, pp.64-82.  It has since been reprinted 
in 2004s The Cambridge Companion to Peirce, edited by Misak. 
 45
4.1 Method 
 Misaks purpose in C.S. Peirce on Vital Matters is to resolve what she views as 
an unproductive tension within Peirces later philosophy, that between science and vital 
matters.  Her motivation in dissolving this tension, which she views as a product of 
Peirces no belief in science thesis, is to demonstrate that Peirces epistemology and his 
ethics  often disparaged  are actually continuous.  By showing that this continuity 
exists, Misak aims to show that Peirces pragmatism can support the moral cognitivism 
she champions.  As such, Misak is coming at the double aspect question regarding 
Peirces theory of belief indirectly, through the lens of assessing his philosophy as a 
suitable foundation for moral cognitivism.  She ultimately rejects Peirces apparent 
advancement of a dualistic theory of belief in favour of a unitary theory that she holds to 
be Peircean155, pragmatist, and practicable. 
 Misak begins her investigation of Peirces take on vital matters by reminding us 
of his views on the concept of belief itself, particularly as it relates to truth.  Peirces 
conception of a true belief, she declares, is a belief which would forever meet the 
challenges of reasons, argument, and evidence.156  This view, she feels, is very friendly 
to cognitivism about morals157  in other words, she thinks that it is arguable that Peirce 
thought that moral matters are as suitable a forum for inquiry as scientific realms, and 
that in determining moral matters we are responsive to reasons, argument, and evidence.  
However, making this argument requires countering the view that Peirce has only 
                                                
155 Here I am using the term Peircean in much the same way that Christopher Hookway does, which is as 
being more or less coextensive with pragmatist, where pragmatist means in accordance with Peirces 
pragmatic maxim. (BCM, 27)  Peircean can also be construed as what Peirce thinks or what Peirce 
would think, and this is the sense in which I use the term elsewhere. 
156 PVM, 150. 
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unhelpful things to say regarding ethics.158  That view is fuelled, Misak thinks, by 
Peirces distinction between science and vital matters.  Peirce appears to hold that the 
former proceeds stoically in pursuit of the truth and is above the business of belief, while 
the latter is concerned with answers and action and needs belief as quickly as possible.  
Still, Misak thinks that Peirces philosophy  in particular, his epistemology  can be 
made to support the view that despite its vital character, ethics, like science, is concerned 
with truth.  But making this step requires rejecting Peirces sometime thesis that belief 
has no place in science.  In order to demonstrate that this is a legitimate strategy, Misak 
endeavours to show that saying that belief is out of place in science is not the best way 
Peirce could have put his point.159  Rather, she suggests that [w]hat Peirce was getting 
at when he made these odd remarks is that the scientist must keep his eye on the fallible 
nature of belief.160  Thus, Misak holds that Peirces introduction of a no belief in 
science thesis is an unnecessary complication, and proposes that his view can support a 
unitary concept of belief that operates in both science and ethics, as both constitute 
inquiry and, as such, aim at truth in their own ways. 
 Despite the obvious appeal of her strategy161, Misak rightly considers that she 
must validate the outright rejection of Peirces no belief in science thesis before 
attempting to develop a pragmatic cognitivism on the basis of Peirces epistemological 
foundation.  She proposes to accomplish the requisite refutation via the following two-
pronged argument: firstly, she seeks to demonstrate that there are similarities in Peirces 
attitudes towards science and other forums for inquiry, such as ethics and metaphysics; 
                                                
158 PVM, 151. 
159 PVM, 152. 
160 PVM, 152. 
161 After all, the revisionist take on Peirces theory of belief is unquestionably less complicated, and (at 
least in Misaks version) proposes to make intellectual space for a pragmatist ethics with actual currency. 
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and secondly, she seeks to undermine the relevance and significance of what she takes to 
be no more than a series of scattered remarks relegating belief to the realm of vital 
matters and truth to the realm of science. 
 The first half of Misaks argument against the relevance of Peirces thesis on 
science and belief relies on excavating Peircean texts to unearth a strand of continuity 
between his attitudes toward the various different sciences.  Misak argues that the 
existence of this strand undermines Peirces oft repeated distinction between science and 
vital matters, despite his obvious attachment to that division.  She allows that [t]here is 
no use in denying that the distinction between vital and scientific matters was dear to 
Peirce, but suggests that the distinction is not a problem for the cognitivist once we 
understand Peirces unique use of terms such as instinct and experience, and the role 
that they play in the scientific business of inquiry.162 
Instinct, Misak points out, is part of the scientific method insofar as abduction, 
which Peirce considered nearly synonymous with hazarding an educated guess, furnishes 
us with the hypotheses that act as the starting place for inquiry through no mechanism 
other than instinctual inspiration.163  Also, and perhaps more compellingly, Misak argues 
that the sense of certainty which causes us to feel that an inference is correct is based on 
instinct and reliance on engrained habits of reasoning.  Instinct provides us with the 
regulative assumptions that guide inquiry.164  So, she concludes, if instinct has a place in 
science, its defining role in vital matters does not demarcate a conceptual boundary 
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163 PVM, 159.  One might be prepared to argue that Misaks description of abduction as providing the 
fallible starting points of the scientific method might cast abduction, and thus instinct, as a catalyst for 
scientific inquiry, rather than a part of it. 
164 PVM, 160.  Again, it is debatable whether something that guides inquiry is really a part of its process. 
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between what Peirce saw as pure sciences, such as mathematics and logic, and 
practical sciences, such as ethics and anthropology.165 
Continuing in the same vein, Misak expounds on Peirces view of experience, 
which is considerably broader than many standard definitions that limit the concept of 
experience to that which occurs via sensory perception.  In Peirces terms, for an episode 
of cognitive stimulation to count as experience, it needs only to have a positive 
qualitative content.166  In Misaks terms, Peirce views experience as justwhatever 
prevents someone from believing exactly what he wants to believe.167  Such experience 
can be either real (sensory) or ideal (thought-based), and can participate in a wide variety 
of experimental modes, not merely pure scientific experiments.  Since this broad view 
of experience allows that experimentation can be pursued both in the inner, mental world 
and the outer, physical world, Misak concludes that ethical experimentation is both viable 
and valid in Peirces view of scientific method.  Thus, moral hypotheses are candidates 
for inquiry aiming at truth, for truth-values, and yet nonetheless, for belief. 
In tandem with her extrapolation of Peirces account of the role of instinct in 
science, this inclusive view of experience serves to narrow the gap between ethics as a 
vital matter and ethics as a science.  Misak claims that her description of the shared 
features of ethics and other sciences as all falling within the rubric of the Peircean 
definition of inquiry reveals a certain Peirce, one that she sees as putting [e]thics and 
                                                
165 This distinction is advanced in Philosophy and the Conduct of Life.  It is noteworthy here that Peirce 
did consider ethics to be a science, just not a pure science; nor is his division bivalent: he describes the 
various sciences on a spectrum, and often expresses hope that we might become more scientific about those 
sciences that are now operating on the basis of our intense interest and sense of personal investment, such 
as ethics. 
166 PVM, 154. 
167 PVM, 155.  Strictly speaking, this is not a definition of experience but of recalcitrant experience  as it 
certainly seems that Peirce would allow that there is experience that reinforces either a belief directly in 
question or the body of background beliefs. 
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sciencein the same boat.168  This is the Peirce that Misak wants to draw out, as the 
position she develops on his behalf supports her own commitment to keeping 
philosophy in touch with experience and practice169  despite his many comments to the 
contrary.   
 The second half of Misaks double-barrelled argument against Peirces no belief 
in science thesis is meant to obviate the importance of those comments Peirce makes 
that are contrary to the unitary view of belief and inquiry Misak is describing in her 
version of his account of science and vital matters.  In the larger framework of using 
Peirces pragmatism as a foundation for moral cognitivism, there is no place for what 
Misak calls a contentious view of science, in which belief is out of place.170  
Interestingly, unlike the first part of her argument for the dismissal of Peirces no belief 
in science thesis and the distinction between science and vital matters that it engenders, 
this second step relies on textual analysis in only a very limited way and instead draws 
mainly on factors external to Peirces writings to reject the notion that his remarks on the 
role of belief in science might be significant. 
 Although Peirce comments on belief and science extensively in both the 
Cambridge Conference lectures of 1898 and the Harvard lectures of 1903, Misak chooses 
to focus on a draft of Peirces application for funding to the Carnegie Institution to 
demonstrate inconsistency in his attitude about the role of belief in science.  Based on 
Peirces claims in this draft, Misak argues that what Peirce really thinks is that belief is 
not out of place in sciencejust tempered by fallibilism.171  In addition to the 
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application to the Carnegie Institution, Misak also cites two of Peirces unpublished 
papers, 1898s Detached Ideas on Vitally Important Topics and 1902s Reasons 
Rules, as places where Peirce emphasizes the fallibility of scientific inquiry, which he 
compares to walking on a bog, where each step one takes might lead either to the surprise 
of being supported or the surprise of finding oneself decidedly soggy.172 
 Misak dismisses the Cambridge lectures, where Peirce first makes consistent 
mention of his developing no belief in science view, as she believes that they are not 
the best place for discerning Peirces considered view about science and vital matters.173  
What leads Misak to this quick dismissal is the fact that during the composition of the 
lectures, Peirce was irate with William James, under whose auspices Peirces Cambridge 
series had been arranged.  It is true, as Misak says, that James had charitably set up the 
lectures, and from the position of having done so, had put considerable pressure on 
Peirce regarding their content  specifically, exhorting him to not to deal with logic, 
which James often said he himself had no head for.174  These facts are sufficient for 
Misak to conclude that the remarks Peirce makes on the separation of science and vital 
matters simply cannot be taken seriously once it is seen that Peirce was wounded about 
being told, in such an offensive way, to excise the hard reasoning and logic from his 
lectures.175 
 In addition to the claim that the content and tone of the Cambridge lectures was 
influenced by Peirce being nastily disposed towards James suggestion that Peirce write 
                                                
172 The science-as-bog metaphor does appear in Detached Ideas on Vitally Important Topics, but is 
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173 PVM, 163. 
174 James was so adamant that Peirce should avoid logic in favour of topics of a vitally important 
character that he exhorted Peirce to keep the lectures as unmathematical as in you lies.  RLT, 
Introduction:25. 
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on vital matters, Misak also suggests that Peirce seesaws about the no belief in 
science thesis within the lectures themselves.176  Specifically, in the first lecture, 
Philosophy and the Conduct of Life, Misak thinks it is contradictory that Peirce asserts 
on the one hand that we are driven oftentimes in science to try the suggestions of 
instinct, but we only try them and that [n]othing is vital for science; nothing can be; 
and on the other hand that science does produce what it holds as established truths, 
against which new hypotheses are judged.177  Misak takes it that Peirce thinks the 
scientist, for all intents and purposes, believes in her established truths  or at least, that 
Peirce thinks so some of the time.    She then calls for a judgment on the basis of efficacy, 
saying that [I]f we have to choose, on their merits, which of Peirces opposing views of 
science to accept, the choice is easy.178  Peirce simply fails to see that scientists accept 
their established truths as the backdrop against which experiments occur, and just makes 
a mistake here.179  Misak concludes that If we drop Peirces contentious thought about 
science, we can discern a coherent and very sensible position.  In both scientific and 
moral matters, we have cherished beliefs which are nonetheless responsive to 
experience.180  By demonstrating that there are correlations in Peirces attitude towards 
the sciences generally and ethics specifically and rejecting his no belief in science 
thesis, Misak is satisfied that she has shown that Peirces pragmatism can support a 
robust moral cognitivism.  Whether or not one wishes to challenge Misaks attribution of 
some such theory to Peirce himself, we might well think that she has demonstrated that 
his philosophy can provide a foundation for one.  However, given that the outcome of 
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such a discussion, while interesting to any contemporary pragmatist  as well as their 
detractors  is not strictly relevant to the inquiry at hand, let us turn to a more specific 
analysis of Misaks treatment of the double aspect question. 
4.2 Merits 
 The chief merit of Misaks exposition of the problems caused by the no belief in 
science thesis is that it is constructive, seeking not to make light of what she considers 
unfortunate errors but to correct them in a way that gives the subtleties of Peirces work 
their due.  Faced with a thesis that she considers contentious, problematic for the ethicist, 
and  perhaps most damningly  inconsistently held, Misak nonetheless sets about 
rescuing Peirce from his own obtuseness with admirable patience and scholarship.  In at 
least some ways, her attempted rescue is successful: her analysis of Peirces theory of 
belief produces something free of contradiction, and hence, practicable. 
One of the main reasons to take issue with Peirces theory of belief in its original 
form is that its internal contradictions appear to make it impossible to actually use.  How, 
the prospective Peircean is forced to ask, can I use the scientific method to fix belief 
when belief plays no role in science?  By excising the no belief in science thesis from 
Peirces account, Misak eliminates the source of such contradictions.  She allows belief 
back into science, and illuminates its role as the background of scientific investigation, 
but also upholds the Peircean requirement for awareness of the fallibility of belief in all 
modes of inquiry, ethics included.  She also emphasizes the importance of behaving as an 
inquirer in as many areas as possible  be it mathematics, metaphysics, or morals.  As 
such, her account is in tune with what is perhaps Peirces most famous bit of rhetoric, his 
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injunction to obey the slogan Do not block the path of inquiry.181  Furthermore, the 
cognitivism that Misak advances is meant to be continuous with Peirces epistemology, 
with which she has no issue once the role of belief in science is clarified to her 
satisfaction.  This suggests that the moral cognitivism advanced by Misak can be 
practiced by one who is a Peircean in other respects, albeit not an orthodox one.182 
 As to whether the theory of belief that Misak ascribes to Peirce is practicable 
independent of the theory of ethics that she sees it as serving so well, the answer seems to 
be that it is at least as applicable as Peirces own view, and certainly easier to understand.  
The concept of belief advanced by Misak is one that is complementary with experience in 
all its various forms, and in all cases, fallible and revisable on the basis of sufficient 
recalcitrant experience.  She holds that scientific hypothesis is a form of belief like any 
other, merely one where it is especially important to be mindful of the fallibility of our 
belief forming processes, no matter how purely motivated the inquiry.  This certainly 
seems more realistic than Peirces view of pure science, which casts the scientist in the 
role of disinterested observer, one who has no belief and no particular care as to how her 
experiment turns out.  It also elevates those who inquire in the area of practical sciences, 
such as ethics, to the same station as that of the scientist  namely, that of the Peircean 
inquirer, who will strive to find those beliefs which will not be overturned by 
recalcitrant experience and argument  in other words, those that are true.183  There is 
every reason to think that true beliefs, on the pragmatic meaning of true, will tend to 
guide us satisfactorily through the world insofar as they insulate us from the unpleasant 
and doubt-producing experiences sure to result from less well-supported views, so insofar 
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as Misak still applies Peirces pragmatic maxim to the notion of belief, she has a view 
that helpfully simplifies belief itself and maintains its essential connection to the conduct 
of life, while making space for it in the realm of pure science. 
In the end, Misak is in the business of resolving the issue of the no belief in 
science thesis in Peirces theory of belief in order to set the scene for advancing a theory 
of ethics.  That theory sets a difficult ideal for the everyday believer to uphold 
consistently, given its aim at truth rather than preference or relative acceptability, but it is 
obviously complementary with her commitments to Peircean epistemology and fostering 
a connection between philosophy and practice.  In a truly Peircean spirit, she does not 
hold that a pragmatist moral cognitivism will furnish us with the absolute facts on the 
basis of our instinct, but that it will illuminate the necessity for sustained and serious 
inquiry into moral problems.  For any pragmatist interested in doing ethics seriously, 
Misaks version of Peirces theory of belief is unquestionably an improvement over the 
original.  The question to ask now is whether we ought to accept it  or whether there are 
some problems posed by Misaks method of exploration that should cause us to hesitate 
to accept her revisionist view. 
4.3 Problems 
While Misak is certainly correct in her assertion that there are many wrinkles in 
Peirces brand of pragmatism that need to be worked out, her identification of a strand 
of conceptual continuity between science and ethics strikes one less as revelation about 
Peirces philosophy and more as a recasting of that philosophy in light of certain aims.  
At several points in C.S. Peirce on Vital Matters, Misak admits her cognitivist agenda, 
which appears to be her only motivation for taking up the question of Peirces no belief 
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in science thesis.  The directedness of her investigation leads to a number of questions 
and concerns regarding its validity: firstly, her discussion seems somewhat arbitrary in 
terms of the texts selected for analysis; secondly, it does not make any serious attempt to 
reconcile Peirces account of belief internally; and thirdly, it fails to address the 
significance of Peirces intellectual heritage in assessing the distinction drawn between 
science and vital matters.  Taken together, these three issues combine to produce the 
worry that Misaks modified version of Peirces theory of belief, while clearly 
pragmatist, may be out of concert with significant Peircean themes.184 
The first issue is the least serious, as it is practically necessarily the case that one 
must select a cross-section when assessing Peirces writings on any topic.  He was such a 
prolific writer that a complete textual exegesis on any topic would require far more space 
than one is allowed for a journal-length article.  Still, there are more and less appropriate 
choices for investigating a topic within Peirces oeuvre, and on the questions of science 
and vital matters and the role of belief in science, there is at least one seminal text that 
Misak overlooks  namely, the Harvard lectures of 1903.  Even if one accedes to the 
claim that we cannot take the Cambridge lectures seriously due to Peirces mood at the 
time, there is certainly no similar barrier to accepting the seriousness of the scholarship 
exhibited by Peirce in the Harvard lectures, despite his relationship with James again 
being under some stress at the time, as James had once again saved Peirce from a 
financial drought by arranging a lecture series using his influence and not an 
inconsiderable amount of his own money.  The animosity between the two at that time 
was directed from James towards Peirce (rather than the reverse as had been the case 
during the period of the Cambridge series), and as such was highly unlikely to have 
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affected the composition of the Harvard lectures.  These lectures comprise a clear and 
systematic presentation of the main themes and applications of Peirces pragmatism, and 
also include exposition on the role of belief in science, deeming it once again to be non-
existent.185  Misak curiously overlooks this explicit statement of the no belief in science 
thesis, despite having sought refutation of it in far less prominent places.186 
I would now further suggest that the importance of the Harvard lectures makes it 
worthwhile to reconsider the significance of the Cambridge lectures, despite Misaks 
suggestion that Peirce was unreliable at the time due to his crankiness towards James.  
While it is certainly true that every Peirce scholar owes a debt to William James, without 
whom Peirce would have been even less well known by his contemporaries (had he 
survived at all), the correspondence from the period of the Harvard lectures reveals that 
they had a relationship that was both a genuine friendship and a genuine source of 
frustration to them both.  Peirces main motive in choosing the content of the Harvard 
lectures was to disambiguate his own pragmatism from other doctrines going by that 
name  most notably James  and this determined the content of the Harvard lectures in 
a way that James found most disagreeable.    In a letter in the spring of 1903, James 
complained about Peirces unconstrained penchant to declare publicly what he had 
determined to be philosophically true, no matter whose feathers it might ruffle  the 
feathers in question undeniably being his own.187  The point of highlighting the volatile 
nature of the relationship shared by the two men is simply to make it clear that it was an 
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enduring feature, and as such, would have been unlikely to seriously affect Peirces 
ability to do philosophy  which might lead us to think that the theses advanced by Peirce 
in the Cambridge lectures are, in fact, quite serious.  Another reason to think that this is 
so, specifically with respect to the question of Peirces no belief in science thesis, is 
that in addition to being echoed in the Harvard presentation, it occurs more than once 
within the Cambridge lectures  a fact that does not emerge in the course of Misaks 
discussion due to limiting the discussion of the Cambridge series to merely the first of 
those lectures, despite the clarity of exposition of the no belief in science thesis is The 
First Rule of Logic. 
Despite the fact that Misak does not discuss Peirces Harvard lecture series at all, 
nor the Cambridge series in a sustained way, it seems fair to assume that had she done so, 
she would still have rejected the notion that the claims regarding the role of belief in 
science would be vindicated elsewhere in Peirces writings.  This leads to my second 
concern with Misaks account: given that she finds his expression of a no belief in 
science thesis contentious, it appears that she is primarily seeking texts supporting its 
excision, rather than texts supporting its inclusion.  This is not to say that Misaks inquiry 
is arbitrary, but merely that it is directed  the desire to render Peirces theory of belief 
commensurate with a practicable theory of ethics in the form of moral cognitivism is 
what drives Misaks investigation into the seemingly dualistic conception of belief that 
Peirce maintains alongside his division between science and vital matters, and what 
ultimately causes her to reject his no belief in science thesis as a mistake.  It should 
come as no surprise, then, that Misak does not make an attempt to reconcile Peirces 
disparate claims about belief internally.  This is perhaps a suitably Peircean point: an 
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inquiry into the nature of his account of belief would be most likely to yield truth if it 
were, as he puts it, scientifically disinterested.  But Misak wants belief to be put into 
service on behalf of truth in science and vital matters, and has come into the investigation 
with her own commitment to keeping philosophy in touch withpractice188  and 
consequently, does not treat the notion that Peirces contradictory comments on belief 
might be a candidate for internal resolution, rather than outright excision. 
Both the choice not to attempt an internal resolution and the underestimation of 
the significance of Peirces seemingly stray comments on the role of belief and science 
are, I think, a product of the third concern I have identified with Misaks assessment of 
Peirces theory of belief, which is that it does not fully appreciate the significance of 
Peirces intellectual heritage.  That heritage, it seems clear, supports the distinction drawn 
between science and vital matters and the exclusion of belief from the realm of science  
and the place where this point is put most clearly is alongside Peirces first mention of the 
no belief in science thesis, in Philosophy and the Conduct of Life.  Here, Peirce 
states that the biggest mistake ever made in philosophy was perpetrated by the Ancient 
Greeks, who expected philosophy to affect lifeforthwith in the person and soul of the 
philosopher himself.189  Peirce calls committing this error a Hellenistic tendency, and 
suggests that the antidote to it was provided by Aristotle, who was a thorough-paced 
scientific man and set this matter right.190  In Peirces view, Aristotle set it right by 
dividing the pursuit of knowledge into theoretical sciences, such as logic; and other 
branches such as aesthetics and moral theory, which he saw as vastly different  contra 
Plato, who had inherited the Hellenistic error.  Peirce then informs his audience at 
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Cambridge that in this respect I stand before you an Aristotelian and a scientific man, 
condemning with the whole strength of conviction the Hellenistic tendency to mingle 
Philosophy and Practice.191  This stance makes sense of Peirces classification of the 
sciences, where he consistently puts the descriptive before the normative192, and also of 
his repeated insistence that science be separated from vital matters.  Peirce sees science 
and other realms where inquiry can be applied, such as the everyday conduct of life, as 
different in kind.  This position is clearly different from the one that Misak wishes to 
champion under Peirces banner.  In her account, the gap between science and vital 
matters is problematic at least partially because of her own commitment to keeping 
philosophy in touch withpractice.193  Misak is working under the assumption that the 
gap between science and vital matters is one that we should wish to close, but for Peirce 
the opposite is true  the maintenance of that gap is studied, deliberate, and rationally 
motivated. 
Once we remind ourselves that Peirce is a committed Aristotelian  a fact borne 
out not just by the two lecture series that we have explored so thoroughly here, but also 
supported by his other attempts at a systematic presentation of his philosophy194  his 
remarks on the role of belief in science, as compared to its place in the conduct of life, 
begin to fall into place, though there are certainly still contradictions to be resolved.  This 
line of thinking leads one naturally to the following thought: might it not be worthwhile 
to attempt to reconcile the contradictions caused by Peirces no belief in science thesis 
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by a kind of internal audit?  This is a possibility that Misak never seriously entertains, but 
there is a competitor to her parsimonious position that does.  If it can be demonstrated 
that Peirces account, rightly interpreted, is internally consistent, then it may well be that 
the problem is not for Peirce on belief but for the case that Peirces theory can be made to 
support moral cognitivism.  This would not undermine Misaks eloquent arguments that a 
pragmatist cognitivism is desirable, but would demand the admission that to base such a 
theory on Peirces foundation requires revising Peirces philosophy to suit a first 
principle that he would never have endorsed, which is that philosophy and the conduct of 
life are continuous and hence that philosophy and practice should march in step.  
However, the business of this project is not to address the uneasy relationship between 
pragmatism and ethics, but to determine whether Peirces theory of belief can be 
understood as consistent in itself and cohesive with his larger epistemology.195  To see 
whether this is so, I turn now to the main competitor to the parsimonious Peircean 
position on Peirces theory of belief: the conservative Peircean position. 
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revisiting, preferably from the perspective of assessing Peirces theory of belief independently of the 
question of its utility for moral cognitivism. 
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5. The Conservative Peircean Position 
 Unlike the parsimonious position, this stance is characterized by the notion that 
resolving the contradictions found in Peirces writings on belief relies upon recognizing 
that they are only apparent contradictions, which can be resolved via close reading and 
holistic analysis.  The conservative position suggests that an inclusive analysis of Peirces 
epistemology at different points in the development of his system as a whole reveals an 
interesting and consistent account wherein what is referred to as believing occurs 
differently in the cases of science and vital matters, or everyday life practices.  Thus, 
there is nothing inherently contradictory in Peirces saying both that belief should aim at 
truth and that it is acceptable (or even desirable) to fix belief by other methods, nor does 
his no belief in science thesis comprise a flaw in his larger body of work on belief 
worthy of excision.  This position is exemplified by Mark Migottis analysis in his 2005 
article The Key to Peirces View of the Role of Belief in Scientific Inquiry.196  
Migottis analysis is both the most recent I have found on this topic and the most 
germane, as it responds directly to Misak on the issue of Peirces problematic theory of 
belief. 
5.1 Method 
 Unlike Misak, Migotti tackles the double aspect question head on, as a problem in 
itself that demands resolution.  He begins his analysis of the no belief in science thesis 
by citing Peirces Cambridge lectures as the source of the dilemma at hand, and 
suggesting that it is possible to resolve the tensions illuminated in Misaks discussion 
without excising material from Peirces later writings.  Migottis argument for conserving 
Peirces later remarks about the role of belief in science proceeds by two strategies: 
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firstly, he proposes to demonstrate that Peirce can coherently promote sedulously 
keeping belief out of the picture in scientific investigations while still advocating the 
merits of the scientific method of fixing belief; and secondly, he strives to show that 
careful interpretation solves the conundrum of how the scientific mode of inquiry, 
having no relation to belief, can nonetheless produce it.197  This demonstration proceeds 
by close textual analysis of Peirces Cambridge lectures as a whole, and operates under 
the following thesis:  the position Peirce argued for in the spring of 1898 isin no way 
anomalous, and moreover, pace Misak, true and interesting.198 
 Migotti begins the demonstrative portion of his analysis by disambiguating 
Peirces no belief in science thesis from that advanced by Karl Popper.  As Migotti puts 
it, Poppers banishment of belief from science followsfrom his banishment of the 
knowing subject from epistemology, but Peirces banishment of belief from science 
cannot be thus motivated.199  Peirces epistemology acknowledges and works within 
the bounds of subjectivity, which necessitates his emphasis on fallibilism but also makes 
a habitable space for the subject  who is, after all, the author and adjudicator of belief.  
[Peirces] doubt-belief theory of inquiry, Migotti points out, makes essential reference 
topsychological states of knowing, inquiring, subjects.200  Because of the difference in 
his attitude towards subjectivity, Peirces account of the role of belief in science differs 
from Poppers in at least the following way: Peirce is concerned with the motivations of 
the scientist, whereas Popper  at least some of the time  is concerned with scientific 
theories, rather than those who practice them.  Still, this point is just the beginning of a 
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clarification of Peirces view on belief, which Migotti admits is a source of vexation to 
interpreters of his philosophy.201 
 Getting to the heart of Peirces account of belief requires more than understanding 
what his theory is not (i.e. Popperian); and Migotti suggests that the apparent 
contradictions are resolved by seeing that [w]hat Peirce has recognizedvery roughly, 
is that the role of belief in genuine inquiry and the life of science is radically different 
from its role in action and practical decision generally and vitally important action and 
practical decision in particular.202  Here it sounds as if Migotti is in agreement with 
Misak, and he concedes that she has a point: the view that science has no truck with 
belief is, and this would certainly be let mot juste, incredible.203  But Migotti is quick to 
follow up on this surface point of agreement by questioning Misaks claim that the 
established truths that Peirce allows a place in science amount to background beliefs, 
and that hence, belief has a demonstrated place in science.  Migottis way of pushing 
back against Misaks explanation draws attention to a most appropriate source: Peirces 
initial elucidation, where he delineates just which concept of belief he means to exclude 
from science: what is properly and usually called belief, that is, the adoption of a 
proposition as apossession for all timehas no place in science at all.204  Such 
propositions are vital for the everyday business of life, where effective certainty is 
required for efficacious action, but what is often called belief in science is not belief in its 
proper and usual sense  rather, it is a kind of opinion.  Migotti makes the comparison 
in the following terms: the full, living belief of momentous action is contrasted with the 
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provisional, quasi-belief of scientific inquiry, the difference being that between an 
attitude held provisionally and one adopted for all time.205 
 Although Migotti makes the point differently, there are some clear echoes here of 
Misaks suggestion that what Peirces no belief in science thesis really amounts to is a 
special emphasis on the fallibility of belief in science.  Migotti is aware of this possible 
interpretation, and remarks at this point that it seems the thesis that full belief has no 
place in science now appears in danger of having been rescued from patent implausibility 
at the cost of latent banality.206  The proposition that those clinging tenaciously to their 
cherished beliefs make poor inquirers is a simple truism, and unworthy, Migotti suggests, 
of the repeated emphasis that Peirce gives to the exclusion of belief from science.  
Another candidate for the status of truism is the claim that the opinion a scientist holds 
with regard to established truths is, for all intents and purposes, a belief  but this is 
where Migotti and Misak part ways.  Misak is content to point out that truism and 
conclude that had he thought about it more carefully, Peirce would have recanted his 
exclusionist thesis regarding belief in science, as opinions on established truths constitute 
background beliefs and thus the scientist is also a believer.  Migotti accepts this, but seeks 
to put it into its proper context: while Peirces view, he argues, is not incompatible with 
Misaks suggestion about the role of background beliefs in science, his theory of belief is 
really a thesis about the character of inquiry and the motivation of those committed to 
engaging in it.  What Peirce is not interested in, Migotti states, is what scientists do or 
believe outside their capacity as scientific inquirers.207  Thus, the fact that the scientist 
has beliefs  say, with respect to vital matters  does not tell against Peirces thesis that 
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belief has no place within the practice of science.  While it can at times be confusing 
because of the casualness with which Peirce moves from talk of inquiry to talk of 
inquirers, when they are separated it appears quite comprehensible that Peirce can hold 
both that science operates in a vacuum of belief and that scientists rely on belief in many 
non-scientific contexts.  The worry that needs to be put to rest is how the scientist keeps 
his beliefs from encroaching on scientific territory, as it still appears that the refusal to 
pledge eternal fidelity to ones beliefs that Peirce sees as requisite for the correct pursuit 
of the scientific enterprise does not stop them from being his beliefs.  As Migotti puts it, 
the scientists denying these beliefs and conclusions any right of permanent abode in his 
mental household seems rather to presuppose than to preclude their current residence at 
that address.208 
 A pattern seems to be emerging here of the patient Peircean excavating the 
sometimes obtuse territory comprising his thought on belief, only to be returned again to 
the position that Peirces rejection of belief in science is either facile or implausible.  
Migotti marks the existence of this pattern, and endeavours to show that the key to 
getting out of it is to consider the Cambridge lectures more closely.  In The First Rule of 
Reason, Peirce states that holding for true is of two kinds; the one is that practical 
holding for true which alone is entitled to the name of Belief, while the other is that 
acceptance of a proposition which in the intention of pure science remains always 
provisional.209  So even if we grant the point that any sort of holding for true is a 
belief, we can allow Peirces distinction between belief in the strictly provisional sense 
and Belief in the fully committed sense.  Once we see that there is a conceptual 
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difference between these two types of holding for true, we should be compelled, Migotti 
says  contra Misak  to ask why [Peirce] would do this.210  In other words, what is the 
value of the distinction that Peirce draws in the first of the Cambridge lectures and 
continues to uphold for the remainder of that series? 
 The difference between scientific belief and practical belief is not, Migotti argues, 
that we have rational self-control over the former but not over the latter.211  Indeed, it 
seems that rational self-control can be employed to the best of our ability in both 
scientific and practical contexts.  Genuine self-control can be exhibited in various 
spheres; by contrast, genuine inquiry has its home in pure science, and this is the point 
that Peirces distinction is meant to draw out.  If we recall that Peirces classification puts 
philosophy into the category of pure science, understanding the corollary of his first rule 
of reasoning reveals the significance of the difference between practical and scientific 
holding for true.  The first rule of reason, Migotti reminds us, is that in order to learn 
you must desire to learn and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline 
to think; its corollary is the celebrated injunction [d]o not block the way of inquiry.212  
In explanation of his position, Peirce further says that adhering to a proposition in an 
absolutely definitive manner - that is, believing it - is fine for practical purposes, but in 
science amounts simply to not wishing to learn.213  As Migotti puts the point, [f]ull 
practical belief is inimical to science because it blocks the way of inquiry.214  Once an 
inquirers own fate or well-being is staked on a proposition, he can no longer undertake 
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any genuine inquiry into the truth of that proposition, but believes it with all the force of 
efficacious practical belief  meaning, in the pragmatic view, that his actions will 
demonstrate the consequences of belief in that proposition, and that he will suffer or 
prosper accordingly. 
 As a further clarification, Migotti points out that Peirce does not mean to simply 
detail a spectrum of belief-strength, where scientific belief is weak and practical belief 
is strong; rather, scientific opinion is equally strong, but remains provisional.215  It has 
the force of full belief, but not its commitment.    What Peirce has recognized, Migotti 
says, is that beliefs or holdings for true can differ in two different ways: there is on the 
one hand sheer degree of credenceand on the other hand a distinction of kind between 
the theoretical[and] the practical manners or modes or contexts of holding for true.216  
For example, the established truths that Misak upholds as an example of belief in science 
are believed very firmly, yet provisionally.  Migotti suggests that weak scientific belief 
is found at the speculative forefront of current research, in those hypotheses so new as 
to have relatively little support and hence commensurately little credence.217  He goes on 
to give examples of weak and strong belief in practical affairs as well, reaffirming that 
strong practical belief is Peirces belief properly and usually so-called.  Having 
sketched the various possible combinations of strong and weak commitment with 
practical and theoretical holding-for-true, Migotti concludes that it is only strong practical 
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belief that Peirce excludes from science, and that this thesis is far from banal, despite 
the various ways in which it has been misinterpreted.218 
 In summation, Migotti makes the following admirably clear point in affirming the 
thrust of Peirces theory, which he presents as essentially a double-aspect view: The 
point of holding things for true in theoretical contexts is to find things out; the point of 
holding things for true in practical contexts is to get things done.219  It is because the 
latter point is true that vital matters are considered vital.  Peirce sees such matters as cases 
where the believer must be prepared to act on the beliefs they take to be true, risking very 
serious (paradigmatically, fatal) consequences.  Science, by contrast, proceeds 
impersonally, indefinitely, with nothing risked and errors to be avoided or expunged 
regardless of the effects.  In science, Migotti remarks, there is always a second chance, 
and a third, a fourth, a fifth and indefinitely many more.220  Real life, it hardly needs 
saying, does not operate that way  and so it appears that Peirces distinction between 
vital matters and science does demarcate two importantly different realms.  On Migottis 
reading of Peirces theory, our attitudes towards belief and action differ dramatically in 
each case.  This does not preclude the possibility of pursuing truth in vital matters, as 
Misak fears, though that pursuit can never supplant the common sense goal of getting 
around in the world so far as practical affairs are concerned; nor does it demand the 
instantaneous rejection of a scientific hypothesis on the basis of a single item of 
experiential evidence, as she suggests.  These questions, as Migotti frames the issue, lie 
outside the scope of the no belief in science thesis as Peirce conceives it.221  The 
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impetus for Peirces dualistic theory of belief, on this account, is based on [t]he need to 
distinguish full, practical belief from provisional scientific belief because belief of the 
former kind very thoroughly and insidiously impedes and discourages honest, fruitful 
investigation.222  Hence, belief in the context of inquiry is essentially provisional.223 
 In the process of giving an interpretation of Peirces theory of belief that renders it 
much less contentious than it appears on the surface, Migotti obtains a solution to the 
remaining problem of how scientific inquiry can be touted as a method for the fixation of 
belief.  The solution for that apparent conundrum is this: while provisional holding-for-
true can never be supplanted by practical holding-for-true within the process of scientific 
inquiry, that process can nonetheless culminate in a hypothesis so widely accepted in 
science that for the purposes of vital matters it can function as a practical belief.  Migotti 
gives an example of how this can be so, describing an exemplary Peircean scientist,  a 
chemistaccosted one night by an exemplary psychotic aficionado of Monty Python like 
humour, who demands of the scientist that he pronounce the atomic number of gold in 
the periodic table or else be shot.224  We are meant to see that should the periodic table, as 
a result of surprising new evidence, be altered such that the atomic number of gold were 
no longer designated as 79, our exemplary Peircean scientist would throw the old 
theory overboard and adopt this new system; yet, for the purposes of being accosted by 
an insane John Cleese impersonator, the same scientist is more than happy to treat that 
provisional belief as true in what unquestionably constitutes a vitally important 
context.225  Migotti makes an important additional point here as well, in claiming that 
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whatever the mental item is that acts as an established truth about the atomic number of 
gold in a scientific context, it is precisely the same item that acts as a full-fledged belief 
in the context of the vital matter of not being shot.  So in the end, having clearly 
distinguished Peirces two ways of seeing the concept of belief, Migotti reunites them 
under the thesis that both modes of belief nonetheless operate by the same mechanism.  
Thus, Migotti ends The Key to Peirces View of the Role of Belief in Scientific Inquiry 
by recapitulating the position he has argued for all along: what separates Peirces 
provisional scientific belief from the robust practical belief employed in vital matters is 
not a difference of kind, but a difference of attitude.226  
5.2 Merits 
 Unsurprisingly, saving Peirce from contradiction is a good deal more complicated 
than dismissing that which complicates; and like Misak, Migotti demonstrates admirable 
patience and scholarship - though it is applied in quite the opposite direction.  The chief 
merit of Migottis work in his chosen direction is that it is maximally charitable to Peirce, 
as it affords the philosopher an opportunity to speak for himself in an inquiry that is 
guided primarily by the simple desire to get to the bottom of Peirces sometimes 
confusing theory of belief.  Like Misak, Migotti hopes to make Peirces theory of belief 
practicable, but attempts to do so by demonstrating that Peirce is not in need of rescue 
after all. 
 Migotti exhibits the principle of charity towards Peirce in a number of ways.  The 
most obvious of these is that he reads Peirce deeply, making a relatively complete 
analysis of the Cambridge lectures to puzzle out the ramifications of the remarks in 
Philosophy and the Conduct of Life that get the no belief in science thesis rolling.  
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Bringing together an analysis of The First Rule of Reason along with the more widely 
known first lecture of the Cambridge series demonstrates that in 1898 there was 
continuity in Peirces thought regarding the role of belief in science, which Migotti 
explores by drawing out the connections between Peirces no belief in science thesis 
and his other theses, such as his position that the will to learn is the prerequisite of 
genuine inquiry.  Migotti also demonstrates charity in one other aspect of his analysis, 
which is that he shores up the cracks in Peirces argument.  This is done in two chief 
ways: firstly, by demonstrating that various other readings of Peirce on this topic have 
been inadequate interpretations; and secondly, by providing examples of how Peirces 
dual aspect theory of belief is meant to function.  Given that there is a paucity of 
compelling examples in Peirces own presentation of the expulsion of belief from 
science, Migottis detailed examples help to demonstrate nicely how the two axes of 
belief (theoretical-provisional and strong-weak) map onto one another.  
The question to ask at this point is whether all this generosity makes Peirces 
theory of belief practicable in its conservative form.  Returning for a moment to Migottis 
examples demonstrates that it is: if we keep Peirces first rule of reason and its corollary 
firmly in mind, we see that the strength of our theoretical beliefs (be they weak 
hypotheses or established truths) in no way affects their fallibility, nor does a strong 
theoretical belief begin to encroach on the realm of practical belief, as the former will 
never inform action in the same way that the latter must.227  Since Migotti frames Peirces 
thesis as being primarily about attitude, all we need do to adopt this version of Peirces 
theory is adopt the prescribed attitudes towards belief in its practical and theoretical 
                                                
227 PVRB, 50.  Migottis example of a strong theoretical belief is The atomic number of gold is 79; while 
strong practical belief is represented by the theistic example I believe in one God, the Father Almighty.   
 72
contexts.  By exhibiting Peirces classification of the two types of holding-for-true in the 
context of real world examples, Migotti demonstrates that in practice, Peirces theory of 
belief can be applied without the bother of what now appear to be merely academic 
complications.  If we accept Migottis interpretation of Peirces concept of holding-for-
true, it does indeed appear that the no belief in science thesis is both plausible and 
Peircean.228 
 Despite the obvious merits of the conservative position that Migotti argues so 
eloquently for, one is forced to ask the following question: could it be possible that 
Migotti has been too generous to Peirce, too vigorous a defender of his view in its 
complete form?  Have his efforts to make Peirce not merely consistent, but palatable, 
obscured certain off-putting aspects of Peirces original view?  There are some 
troublesome aspects of Migottis account that must be considered before it will be 
possible to adjudicate between the conservative view he champions and the parsimonious 
position advanced by Misak. 
5.3 Problems 
 It is perhaps not altogether surprising that Migotti and Misak engage with Peirce 
in some similarly problematic ways  Peirce was, at times, famously obtuse and frankly 
occasionally seems to invite misinterpretation.  Peirce was also an outrageously prolific 
writer, which leaves even his most earnest analyst with a lot of ground to cover.  It should 
be expected, then, that the first problem with Migottis discussion  like Misaks  is that 
it seems somewhat arbitrary in terms of the texts selected for analysis. In Migottis case, 
however, this leads into a second, more serious problem: his account, while robustly 
conservationist, fails to establish sufficient connection with Peirces early work.  This 
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second problem leads to a third, which is that Migotti ultimately arrives at a view of 
Peirces theory of belief that is not entirely accurate  though I will argue shortly that this 
charge is not as serious as it might seem. 
 As I stated earlier, it is, practically speaking, necessarily the case that one must 
select a cross-section when assessing Peirces writings on any topic; however, this does 
not preclude critiquing the choices made.  Migottis selection of writings makes two 
omissions: one that is at the very least odd, and one that is problematic.  The first of these 
two omissions is the same one made by Misak, which is the Harvard Lectures of 1903, 
though neglecting this text seems much stranger from Migottis position given the fact 
that the Harvard material contains an explicit recapitulation of the no belief in science 
thesis and further expounds on its meaning.  Though Migotti makes his argument 
convincingly without use of the Harvard series, its inclusion would surely strengthen that 
argument as well as providing a kind of preemptive response to critics who question the 
validity of gleaning Peirces considered views from the Cambridge lectures.  The other 
omission, which seems more serious in the context of Migottis argument, is the material 
in Peirces early writings in epistemology that supports the advancement of a dualistic 
theory of belief.  As he is arguing for the continuity of Peirces account of belief, as well 
as its commensurability with other Peircean doctrines, it is peculiar and potentially 
worrisome that Migotti includes hardly any reference to Peirces most famous work on 
epistemology, from the perspective of which arguments against Peirces later exclusion 
of belief from science are typically made.  Migotti touches only briefly on The Fixation 
of Belief and makes no reference at all to any of Peirces other prolific early work in 
epistemology. 
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 This leads to what I consider to be a second, more serious problem for Migottis 
exposition of Peirces view of the role of belief in scientific inquiry, which is that it fails 
to establish sufficient connections between that view and Peirces better known 
epistemology.  Peirce discusses belief at considerable length and in some detail in ways 
that would be most helpful for proponents of the conservative position.  This apparent 
oversight may again be a simple issue of inadequate space within the journal format, as 
Migotti does make efforts to establish continuity within Peirces account of science as it 
pertains to the no belief in science thesis, despite having disregarded Peirces early 
comments on the nature of belief and given relatively little space to his formulations of 
the process of belief fixation.  However, not connecting Peirces commentary on the 
exclusion of belief from science in the Cambridge lectures to the original exposition of 
his epistemology leaves Migotti open to a somewhat facile, but nonetheless possible, 
refutation.  The revisionist Peircean camp that he has taken such pains to counter on 
various other points might now attempt a refutation that proceeds along the following line 
of thinking: even if one accepts that Migotti has demonstrated Peirces 1898 theory of 
belief to be internally consistent, and perhaps even interesting and applicable, we ought to 
reject it on the basis that it is not fully commensurable with Peirces early theory of belief 
 or perhaps for various other reasons, such as Misaks suggestion that the Cambridge 
lectures are not a good reflection of Peirces mature thought, or the notion that even if 
Peirces later thought on belief is coherent, the earlier formulation might be preferable. 
 The problem of potential discontinuity does in fact cause an issue for the 
acceptability of the conservative Peircean position as Migotti frames it, as it leads 
naturally to a third and final concern with Migottis representation.  This concern is that it 
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misinterprets Peirces view of belief qua belief and, as a result, softens the seriousness 
with which Peirce banished belief from science.  The questionable move that Migotti 
makes with respect to Peirces definition of belief is to posit that holding for true is 
synonymous with believing, and to suggest that both states are identical mentally229, 
which appears not to be the case if we consider Peirces early analysis of the concept of 
belief.  There, he says that belief has just three properties: we are aware of it; it 
appeases the irritation of doubt; and it involves establishing rules for action.230  The 
essential point here is that belief is intrinsically tied to action.  This makes sense in light 
of the application of Peirces pragmatic maxim to the concept of belief, which yields the 
thesis that believing a proposition is analogous to asserting it to oneself, and that its 
meaning is expressed entirely by its consequences  specifically, the ways in which it 
impacts ones habits and ones actions.  This means that what Migotti describes as 
provisional belief based upon Peirces practical holding for true is not belief by 
Peirces own standard, nor really by any pragmatic standard.  It is not belief by Peirces 
standard because the sort of state Migotti describes as theoretical belief lacks the 
psychological opposition to doubt that Peirce ascribes to a state of belief, as well as the 
necessary connection to action.  It is also not belief by a general pragmatic standard, 
which demands that the assertion one makes to oneself in the form of a belief have 
consequences  if there are no consequences, then the belief is meaningless.  By contrast, 
Peirces scientific holding for true is not meaningless; but it is detached, and ought not to 
be confused with the living, vital, consequential concept that is belief. 
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Despite the worries that I have just described, Migottis attempted resolution of 
the double aspect question within Peirces work on belief satisfies on a number of levels: 
it underscores the importance of seeing Peirce as a scientist with a theory of science 
informed by a sophisticated theory of belief, and leads to an understanding of Peirces 
no belief in science thesis that is much closer to preserving the original version than 
Misaks revisionist account.  I am satisfied that Migotti has shown that Peirces later 
epistemology, particularly his position in the Cambridge lectures, is in no way 
anomalous, and moreoverinteresting.231  However, reservations regarding action and 
the unity of the mental states behind everyday operative belief and scientific provisional 
belief lead me to dispute certain aspects of Migottis conservative Peircean position with 
respect to belief.  While this may sound like a return to the parsimonious position 
advocated by Misak, such a retreat is not the only possible way to resolve the difficulties 
I have just cited. 
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6. The Revised Conservative Position 
While both Misak and Migottis explorations of Peirces advancement of a no 
belief in science thesis have their own merits, it seems clear enough that if we are to 
actually attempt to ascribe one of these positions to Peirce, Migottis is the better 
candidate.  Misaks account endeavours to make Peirces theory of belief useful for a 
specific purpose, at the cost of accurately depicting what Peirce thought about belief as it 
relates to science.232  Her account is unquestionably simpler, and remains true to some 
Peircean themes, such as the emphasis on the fallibility of belief, but is also 
unquestionably distant from what Peirce actually said and neglects the possibly fruitful 
results of considering why he said it.  This is not to say that Misaks parsimonious 
account might not be an objectively better account of belief for a wide variety of 
purposes  it may turn out to be more in tune with contemporary intuitions, better suited 
for everyday use, and superior in its explanatory capacity  but it is still not Peirces 
account, which is the subject of our inquiry here. 
I have suggested that Migottis version of Peirces theory of belief is also not a 
completely faithful representation of the original, though it comes a good deal closer and 
would operate much like it despite the conflation that casts scientific hypothesis as a 
strange breed of belief.  I am now prepared to further suggest that a return to Peirce 
himself will allow us to resolve the minor difficulties within Migottis version of the 
Peircean account of belief and emerge with a revised conservative position that maintains 
Peirces distinctions and emphasizes the compatibility of those distinctions with the 
remainder of his epistemology, especially as it relates to belief fixation and the 
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methodology of philosophy.  I will now argue that it is possible to revise Migottis 
conservative Peircean position in such a way as to give Peirces later developments their 
full due while also addressing difficulties regarding the status of the two types of belief at 
issue and their role in philosophy and the conduct of life.  The result, though a revision of 
contemporary accounts, is  as closely as I have been able manage  a representation of 
Peirces original account. 
6.1 A Conceptual Critique & A Semantic Solution 
 What is required, first of all, is clarity regarding Peirces concept of belief.  We 
must recall that Peirces classification of the sciences sets those he deigns normative 
apart, as they rely on value judgments and the dichotomy of good and bad.233  Belief, 
by Peirces definition, is a form of judgment  it comprises an assertion to the self and is 
always connected to future actions and the development of habits of action.  While it is 
possible to form a judgment that is not a value judgment  for example, that such-and-so 
is the case, which might certainly be useful in vital matters concerning the such-and-so in 
question  even these types of judgment, beliefs about mundane affairs, have a force, an 
essentiality, completely lacking in scientific hypothesis.  Even when our beliefs are not 
value judgments directly, they have value to us, and so our attachment to them cannot be 
expected to be radically provisional, even though they are in principle revisable.  This 
gives us some insight as to why normative sciences, as Peirce categorizes them (including 
ethics), are subject to the rule of pure sciences, wherein he includes philosophy.  In 
Peirces system, it is the job of philosophy to see things as they are, to search for the 
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facts, to operate disinterestedly in the business of moving towards the truth234; it is the job 
of ethics to get us around in the world to the best effect, and unless we are operating as 
scientists, our behaviour must be based on whatever we perceive our favoured facts to be.  
Science, Peirce says, only learns lessons: it does not value facts in themselves and has no 
attachment to any particular set of them, and thus takes an entirely different attitude 
toward facts from that which Practice takes.235 
In practice, the need for a set of judgments to guide us through our everyday 
affairs is why one asserts beliefs to oneself, saying it is the case that p; by contrast one 
merely posits hypotheses, saying let us see what it is like when we operate under the 
notion that it is the case that p.  It is the strength of assertion that makes belief a 
commitment, whereas one is never committed to a hypothesis, save in an academic sense, 
and on a trial basis.  This is why compared with living belief, what we find in science is 
nothing but a ghost.236  In attempting to distance scientific hypothesis from the concept 
of belief, Peirce even goes so far as to state baldly that hypothesis is not a matter for 
belief.237   Peirce meant for belief and scientific hypothesis to be absolutely distinct, 
which is completely consistent with his stance as an Aristotelian: science and the conduct 
of life are definitively not continuous.  Thus, Peirces distinction between science and 
vital matters is well represented by his thesis that belief has no place in science, and by 
his own definition, what we find in science  hypothesis  does not answer to the concept 
of belief.  Belief and scientific hypothesis are perhaps not so different from one another 
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as belief is from doubt, but they do differ, and their conceptual separation within Peirces 
philosophy is consistent with his banishment of belief from science. 
One can imagine the possible objection here that, call it what he likes, Peirces 
hypothesis really does answer to the concept of belief  but this is precisely the point that 
I have argued against by demonstrating that hypothesis is not belief by Peirces own 
lights, and  being essentially divorced from action  cannot answer to the definition of 
belief.  This is why it is necessary to reject Migottis representation of scientific 
hypothesis as theoretical belief.  According to Peirce, there can be no belief in science at 
all.  One cannot assert provisionally, though one might assert claims of varying strengths; 
there is no such thing as theoretical assertion.  In Migottis example, where the intrepid 
chemist responds to the John Cleese impersonator, Migotti claims that a theoretical belief 
is being used in the context of a vital matter; but having clarified Peirces concepts, we 
now see that this is not so.  Rather, the chemist had a real, living belief that expressing 
what the would-be murderer took to be an established truth, a scientific hypothesis so 
well-supported as to produce what Peirce terms extra-scientific certainty238, would lead 
to the preservation of his well-being.  The successful avoidance of harm on the part of 
Migottis scientist does not rely on his believing that the atomic number of gold is 79, but 
on believing that his assailant would believe so and hence that this would be the best 
answer to give.  We can easily reconfigure the scenario such that our chemist is now 
doing ground-breaking research that is leading to the reconfiguration of the periodic table 
of the elements, and working every day in his lab under the hypothesis that all previously 
assigned atomic numbers are incorrect.  Should he encounter the very same Pythonesque 
robber, the chemist would likely believe that the thug is unaware of his groundbreaking 
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new research, and answer with the soon-to-be overthrown established truth that the 
atomic number of gold is 79  and the chemist would very likely be correct in judging 
that his assailant is not up on current developments in the field of chemistry, and get 
away in precisely the same manner that he did in Migottis original example.  In both 
Migottis original example and my modified version, the chemist is relying not upon a 
scientific hypothesis, but on his practical beliefs about the knowledge of chemistry 
possessed by Pythonesque robbers  and if the scenario were to unfold as I described, a 
good thing too, as attempting to use a scientific hypothesis newly held to be true in that 
particular vital matter would likely have led to a grisly end. 
Having established that Peirce considers belief and scientific hypothesis to be 
conceptually distinct, I would now propose that a simple semantic solution would 
alleviate a great deal of the confusion surrounding interpretations of the no belief in 
science thesis that Peirce advances from 1898 on.  Simply put, the committed excavator 
of Peirces texts ought not to refer to hypothesis as belief of any kind in reference to his 
theory.  Scientific hypothesis is not theoretical belief, provisional belief, or proto-belief, 
and bears only surface similarity to belief proper.  The attitude that Migotti rightly points 
to as being Peirce-prescribed is one of disinterest in science whenever one is functioning 
as a scientist.239 Migotti also makes the point that no one is always functioning as a 
scientist nicely by detailing the probable effects of giving up on a cherished hypothesis, 
though the ideal Peircean scientist would studiously avoid coming to cherish any 
particular hypothesis.  The scientific attitude, however, would be completely 
inefficacious in the business of vital matters where, as Peirce says, decisions must be 
made.  Use of clear, unambiguous terminology and an understanding of the different 
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concepts so described will go a long way to resolving the apparent contradictions within 
Peirces work. 
6.2 Three Arguments 
 Now that the distinction between Peirces conception of belief and his notion of 
scientific hypothesis has been made clear, the following thesis emerges: the seemingly 
disparate epistemological views presented by Peirce are actually continuous, but the 
presentation of his account suffers from what might best be described as semantic 
looseness.  This leads to the need to give evidence in favour of the overall coherence of 
Peirces theory of belief, of which I contend that there are three compelling arguments: 
first, Peirce advances a science-other distinction in both his early and later 
epistemological work; second, the distinction between science and vital matters that 
Peirce insists upon has a logical basis; and third, Peirces claims about the role of belief 
in science, despite being somewhat discordant to the modern mind, make sense in light of 
his own definition of belief. 
With respect to the first argument, in order to demonstrate that Peirces early and 
late accounts of belief are commensurable, it is necessary to establish that Peirce does 
advance a science-other distinction in his early work.  Neither Misak nor Migotti explores 
this area of continuity, but it will prove fruitful to the preservation of Peirces original 
theory to do so.  The best place to see how Peirces early work in epistemology 
foreshadows the distinction he later draws between science and vital matters is in the 
papers from the Illustrations of the Logic of Science series published in 1877-1878.  
For example, reflecting from the position of his later lectures, it seems likely that Peirces 
rationale in The Fixation of Belief in claiming that for the mass of humanity, the 
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methods of tenacity, authority, and rationalism are sufficient  despite his recognition of 
the fact that they are not truth conducive  was that most of the time, the mass of 
humanity is not acting philosophically and is happy to operate at some distance from the 
truth, needing only a certain number of perceived facts upon which to base behaviour.  
This is why, despite its massive methodological advantages in pursuit of the truth, Peirce 
does not unequivocally or universally endorse the method of inquiry.  Inquiry is best 
suited to science, while tenacity, authority, and rationalism can never participate in the 
scientific enterprise, though they can sometimes suffice for the purpose of vital 
matters.240  The development of the pragmatic maxim and its application to belief as 
described in How to Make Our Ideas Clear is a second point of obvious continuity, as 
in the Harvard lectures we find Peirce upholding that maxim in its essentials and in its 
application to the concept of belief, with the minimal proviso that he wishes to distance 
himself from his earlier version insofar as he finds it to be overly psychologistic.  Finally, 
the most obvious example of foreshadowing that we see brought to fruition in Peirces 
mature theory of belief is found in his early definitions of belief, especially as they occur 
in Towards a Logic Book where Peirce is concerned with emphasizing the relationship 
between 
 In addition to ferreting out these strands of continuity in the development of 
Peirces theory of belief, we have already seen that Peirce has a logical basis for the 
science-vital matters distinction with respect to belief, as the conceptual differentiation of 
practical belief and scientific hypothesis is based firmly on his classification of the 
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sciences.241   We have also seen that Peirces claims that belief has no place in science are 
supported by his own definition of belief, which describes an intrinsic connection to 
action and a close parallel to assertion.242  These three arguments, taken together, provide 
strong support for Peirces no belief in science thesis being consistently held and 
internally cohesive.  Now, as a final order of business, it is necessary to demonstrate that 
the application of the clarified versions of Peirces concepts of belief and hypothesis will 
dissolve any remaining concerns regarding the compatibility of his description of 
scientific inquiry as a method of belief fixation and his thesis that belief has no place in 
science. 
6.3 Testing The Revised Conservative Position 
 I have advanced, on a textual basis, a revised version of the conservative position 
regarding Peirces theory of belief  one which I have argued captures Peirces intended 
theory more accurately than its competitors.  I hope now to demonstrate that Peirces 
original view, as I have described it243, is capable of resolving the standard difficulties in 
response to which the modified versions of his theory have been advanced.  Addressing a 
complaint shared by our two contributing Peirce scholars should help to demonstrate the 
advantages of the revised conservative position.  The complaint that I have I mind is 
articulated by Christopher Hookway in a form quoted by both Misak and Migotti: if 
application of the scientific method cannot (or should not) produce belief at all, it is hard 
to see how we can view the method of science as a method for the fixation of belief.244  
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Migotti labels this problem a conundrum, vexing to the would-be Peircean.245  Misak 
believes that Peirce just makes a mistake, one that leads to a contentious view better 
off abandoned.246  Each attempts to do away with the problem; Misak by excising a 
chunk of Peirces writing on belief, Migotti by developing Peirces notion that there are 
two types of holding for true into the position that Peirce saw belief as being also of two 
kinds.  Let us now see whether my proposed position can save Peirce from this 
predicament without either excising his entire no belief in science thesis, as Misaks 
version of the theory does, or allowing belief to sneak back into science, as Migottis 
version of the theory permits. 
 The first step in reconciling Peirces seemingly disparate views is to recognize 
that Hookways formulation overstates the problem.  Peirce never actually says that 
scientific method cannot (or should not) produce belief at all247, but merely that belief 
cannot participate in the scientific method.  This makes it much easier to comprehend 
how the second half of Hookways complaint can be reconciled with the first, as Peirce 
does certainly seem to suggest that inquiry can produce belief.248  Upon closer 
examination, this is both reasonable and intelligible: in producing well-supported 
hypotheses, scientific inquiry can and does participate in the production of practical 
belief.  We have even seen how the transition from a scientific hypothesis to a practical 
belief can take place: once a hypothesis has attained the status of established truth, it is 
common sense practice to base practical belief upon it, and this approach likely often 
produces beliefs that work quite well.  As Misak so successfully argues, instinct can be a 
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catalyst for science in that it fuels the formation of hypotheses, and instinct would likely 
also compel us in many cases to accept the well-supported hypotheses and base our 
beliefs for the purposes of vital matters upon them. 
 It is perfectly cohesive to say that belief cannot participate in science itself, 
despite being a product of it  after all, that would undermine the motive for doing 
science, as the absence of the attitude of dissatisfaction with what one already knows that 
Peirce sees as part of the will to learn would act, on his view of the relationship between 
doubt and belief, as a barrier to even consider embarking on inquiry.  It is also perfectly 
legitimate, in the most obvious common sense manner, to adopt scientific hypotheses as 
practical beliefs, though Peirces consistent separation of the two reveals that doing so 
does not make the scientific hypothesis into a belief.  The experiential success of the solid 
common sense practice of adopting well-supported hypotheses as belief may obscure the 
fact that one never actually becomes the other; rather, hypotheses give rise to belief, but 
only when a judgment is made that the support provided by the scientific enterprise is 
sufficient to warrant the birth of a new belief.  Consciously or not, the epistemic agent 
ceases to see the proposition in question as a hypothesis and asserts it confidently  
though to science, a hypothesis it remains.  It is not the case, then, that Peirce banishes 
belief from science only to have it sneak in the back door.  Simply put, science can 
produce what he calls extra-scientific certainty249, but what we must recognize is that 
said production is an external matter.  Science tirelessly pursues its researches; scientists, 
being but human and most certainly fallible, cannot inquire ceaselessly or in all directions 
simultaneously  even the most devout scientist has vital matters to which she must 
attend.  And when the time comes when one must make an assertion, where belief is 
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called for, it is not only commendable but likely most efficacious to base ones beliefs on 
the so-called established truths of science.  Hence, contra Hookway, it is not at all 
incongruous for Peirce to claim both that belief has no place in science and that inquiry, 
which at its best is a scientific business, can produce belief. 
 Despite the success of the revised conservative position in addressing the 
complaint just discussed, there is a second, and perhaps even more serious, concern at 
hand  one which the fan of Peirces account of belief will find alarming.  That concern is 
this: now that we have attributed a plausible and internally consistent theory to Peirce 
regarding belief, what is to be done if that theory puts another part of his overall system 
out of joint?  I have made the weaker half of my case, which is that Peirces theory of 
belief can be construed as consistent, but still owe an account of how that theory of belief 
can be reconciled with the remainder of his epistemology to make the stronger point that 
Peirces theory of belief coheres with the rest of his system.  In order to make that point, 
the natural place to turn is to a concern alluded to by Misak, who worries that a central 
part of the Peircean architectonic is rendered inaccessible by his later theory of belief.  
That area, she suggests, is Peirces account of truth.250  Specifically, the concern is this: if 
belief is strictly in the province of vital matters, how can it  like science  aim at the 
truth?  Conversely, if belief can aim at the truth, why cant it participate in science?  If 
the revised conservative position cannot respond successfully to this objection, a 
plausible reason to retreat to the parsimonious position emerges. 
 However, we need not see that retreat as imminent as, like Hookways concern, 
the problem of getting at truth through a belief-less science and a science-less belief is 
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less daunting once deconstructed.  What we have here are two separate ideas that seem 
supportable on the basis of Peirces no belief in science thesis and his description of the 
performance of belief in vital matters: the first is that science operates in a beliefless void; 
the second is that belief operates in an unscientific pursuit of a ready solution to the 
problems posed in practice.  These ideas are easily reconciled with one another, but not 
with the third notion that both belief and scientific inquiry aim at the truth  after all, how 
can two things so different have the same end? 
The point that must be made with respect to this apparent problem is that Peirce 
never explicitly takes ownership of either of the first two ideas just expressed, and that 
there is considerable support for their reconcilability within the work that we have been 
discussing.  With respect to the first idea, there is all kinds of room to argue, as Misak 
does quite well, that even the most ascetic of scientists is operating with a truckload of 
background beliefs.   As Misak puts it, the scientist must believe, and in quite a variety of 
propositions.  She must believe that her regulative assumptions are accurate and that her 
stock of habitual cognitive skills is reliable.251  For example, the scientist must believe 
that scientific inquiry is a worthwhile pursuit and adhere to certain guiding principles for 
its successful execution.  Misak is correct in identifying the existence of a body of 
background beliefs even in scientific inquiry, but this need not undermine the no belief 
in science thesis that Peirce advances  after all, that position calls for no belief in 
science itself, not the banishment of belief from all of the contexts in which scientific 
inquiry is embedded. 
It is also the case that belief can be allowed as a background against which the 
uncertain hypotheses that comprise the stuff of science are tested without presuming that 
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science itself upholds those beliefs as infallible or outside the scope of inquiry.  Rather, 
science proceeds but one inquiry at a time, and what is treated as constant for the purpose 
of considering one hypothesis might well become the subject of a later inquiry.  We also 
might well make mistakes regarding the assessment of a hypothesis if the background 
beliefs that set the parameters of the inquiry are mistaken.  In situations where it is later 
recognized that such errors have been made, new inquiry is necessary and often a 
formerly established truth loses its hold and the thrust of investigation in that realm of 
science is adjusted accordingly. 
All of this can be reconciled with Peirces notion of science  its essential 
disinterestedness and its character of being fundamentally divorced from action, as well 
as its tendency to produce propositions so well-supported that they will be adopted by 
many people as common-sense beliefs.  What Peirce does say in excluding belief from 
the internal processes of scientific inquiry is that if we are to operate as scientists, we 
cannot believe the hypothesis that is currently the subject of our inquiry.  Thus, the 
admission of the possession of background beliefs on the part of the scientific inquirer 
should not lead to the conjecture that she also has belief within the context of her very 
specialized, very particular, inquiry.  Within those bounds and concerning the 
hypothetical proposition under consideration, she is beliefless, much in the way that an 
astronaut on board a space shuttle is without gravity, though he knows very well that it 
holds for him elsewhere.  It is nonetheless a limit of science as a discipline that it 
proceeds one hypothesis at a time, sometimes grudgingly, slowly, in what Peirce sees as 
an interminable march towards a network of ever more feasible hypotheses, towards the 
end of inquiry  truth. 
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With respect to the second idea, that belief operates in a complete disconnect from 
science, we have already seen that Peirces theory does not require this.  In fact, 
understanding how both science and belief aim at the truth relies on understanding 
Peirces suggestion that science produces extra-scientific certainty, and that certain well-
supported hypotheses take on the status of established truths in practice.  Science clearly 
does and can inform belief, and we should not be surprised to find that Peirce thinks that 
belief is at its best when it is so informed  when it operates, one might say, pseudo-
scientifically.  Support for this notion within Peirces writings is widespread: in The 
Fixation of Belief he suggests that we can support questionable beliefs only in the 
absence of any facts to go upon252; once facts impinge upon us in unpleasant ways it is 
difficult indeed to avoid adjusting our belief-set. 
It is also important to make the point that belief, though sometimes founded on 
instinct, is not by nature unreasonable.  While beliefs may owe their inception to the 
impetus of instinct, their continued participation in the corps of our accepted propositions 
often does require reasoning, and since Peirce thinks all reasoning is self-correcting, 
everyday practical belief will ultimately move towards truth  just much more slowly 
than science does, or scientifically informed belief.  That everyday belief does move 
towards truth makes a great deal of sense: after all, we experience many challenges and 
stressors in practice that do not exist in laboratory conditions, and even the most 
dogmatically tenacious believer is willing to revise a belief when it is false in a way that 
will cause him serious harm or inconvenience.  As such, in a loose and haphazard way, 
our everyday beliefs  when challenged  have a tendency to move towards truth, unless 
we take pains to avoid progress in that direction for some reason external to the belief 
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itself.  However, even though practical belief does aim at truth in a rough and ready 
sense, Peirces position nonetheless upholds science as the most sure way of discovering 
truth.  Scientific inquiry and belief both aim at the truth: the former does so as an 
automobile drives on a smoothly paved interstate highway, moving a sedate ten 
kilometers an hour; the latter as the same automobile drives on a hilly costal highway 
moving at breakneck speed  in the pouring rain.  Clearly, one method is more likely to 
allow the driver to arrive in one piece. 
Given what he sees as the sturdy and immovable character of science, it is not 
surprising that Peirce constantly exhorts us to be more scientific, to pursue inquiry 
wherever possible if we would like to get to truth.  This exhortation expressed in terms of 
belief fixation in his early epistemological work seems at odds, however, with the 
dismissive talk about belief that we see in the later period, but this is easily clarified.  
Simply put, Peirce is often ambiguous as to whether he is speaking descriptively or 
normatively.  In sliding between descriptive and normative talk of belief, Peirce rarely 
signals the change, but describes belief from both positions, which can be confusing.  An 
example of this phenomenon appears in The Fixation of Belief, where in a single page 
he makes both the descriptive claim that the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of 
opinion and the normative claim that It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be 
such as may truly guide our actions, with no indication that he is making a transition 
from describing how the psychological processes of inquiry are to making a value claim 
about how belief should be.253  In spite of this sometimes frustrating lack of clarity within 
Peirces discussions of belief, I have endeavoured to show that not only does Peirce not 
explicitly support the theses the belief is always essentially unreasonable or that science 
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operates in a belief-less void, but that there is in fact considerable textual evidence 
supporting the notion that Peirce thinks that the best science can legitimately be viewed 
as a source of propositions fit for belief and that the best beliefs are formed on the basis 
of extra-scientific certainty.  Thus, since belief and science can operate compatibly, it is 
not the case that banishing belief from the internal workings of science severs the 
fundamental connection between either belief and truth or science and truth. 
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7. Conclusion 
At the end of this investigation into Peirces account of belief, several conclusions 
can be drawn.  In presenting Peirces work on belief chronologically, it has become 
apparent that his later theory of belief is a development of his early views, rather than a 
refutation of them or an error made in spite of them.  In exploring how Peirce presents his 
theory of belief, especially in the Cambridge and Harvard lectures, it has become obvious 
that his no belief in science is more nuanced and more sympathetic than it first appears.  
Finally, in evaluating Peirces theory of belief in light of the double aspect question, I 
have concluded that it is not necessary to modify Peirces theory of belief by excising 
difficult material or to reframe it in terms of a dualistic conception of belief.  Although it 
cannot be disputed that Peirces account seems contradictory on the surface, close reading 
reveals a consistency of thought and purpose within his writings on the topic of belief. 
Based on my attempts to develop arguments for what I have labelled the revised 
conservative view, I submit that the option of maintaining Peirces account of belief in its 
original form is now clearly viable.  Developed primarily in contrast to the work of Misak 
and Migotti, the arguments for my thesis that the seemingly contradictory 
epistemological view presented by Peirce are actually continuous are: firstly, that Peirce 
advances a science-other distinction in his early work; secondly, that Peirce has a logical 
basis for his distinction between science and vital matters, which is found in his 
classification of the sciences; and thirdly, that Peirces claims that belief has no place in 
science are in line with his own definition of belief.  I have also attempted to address 
possible objections to my view, such as the Hookway objection and the concern 
regarding an apparent disjunct with Peirces theory of truth.  Despite all this, the 
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temptation may still exist to throw that account overboard, salvage what one likes, and try 
to construct a better bet.  That temptation owes its appeal to the fact that the gap between 
practice and philosophy that Peirce persists in maintaining and idealizing strikes many 
minds as troublesome.  However, the foregoing analysis should suffice to demonstrate 
that since Peirces no belief in science thesis is founded on his classification of the 
sciences, which upholds the supremacy of logic and views philosophy as coextensive 
with logic, revising his theory of belief requires revising his system at a much larger scale 
 and even then, to do so, one would need to import foreign first principles.  We can 
conclude that although one might disagree with Peirces insistence on the separation of 
science from everyday practice for various reasons, close analysis of his texts reveals an 
account that is both internally consistent and commensurate with the larger body of his 
epistemology. 
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